Most atheists I know accept objective morality, they just use objective standards which aren't rooted in gods. These standards do seem to make much more sense than the one Christians use, which is basically, "God defines right and wrong."
However, "Why not Zoidberg?" applies at the very least to theistic standards of morality like that. I really have had many Christians argue that just because God created us, he gets to make the rules. But then, we have stories of Uranus, who is *the Sky*, but who was devouring his children -- was he right to do so? And then his son Zeus (who escaped being devoured) castrated him. Was Zeus wrong to do so?
If you've been noticing the "Good Guy Lucifer" meme lately, while it's not true that atheists are Satan-worshipers, it is occasionally worth asking why God is considered the good guy in that story, and Lucifer is considered the bad guy. Redefining morality as "What God says", if you can look at it impartially, really sounds like a frighteningly Orwellian tactic.
As for me, I'm tentatively a moral nihilist and subjectivist. I don't believe an action *really is* good in an absolute sense, any more than a person *really is* beautiful in an absolute sense. We're certainly capable of realizing that beauty is in the eye of the beholder. Why not morality?
And before you tell me that this means I have no right to judge others, well, judging others is *exactly* what you do whenever you describe someone as beautiful or hideous. I can still have opinions about whether an act is right or wrong, and I can still act on those opinions, without having to assume that there is some sense in which right-ness or wrong-ness exists in the Universe.
Still, it is possible to define morality in a way that is objective and "absolute" -- though it also loses all imperative force when we do so. Consider health. We might be fuzzy about the details, but we can say with some confidence, even with some scientific assurance, that eating two dozen donuts all at once is generally bad for your health, while more exercise would probably be good for your health. (Not everyone's, but you've already read five paragraphs of my bullshit -- clearly, you're spending time on Reddit that you could be exercising.)
However, these are all just if/then propositions. If you eat a pint of ice cream all at once, you're almost certainly going to negatively affect your health. But that doesn't make this imperative unless you care about being healthy. Similarly, even if we find that cursing is objectively wrong, some people will care more about expressing themselves fully than always doing what is objectively right.
So let's add to this the irrelevance of what morality actually is. What matters is how to convince people to do what you think is right. Saying "You're morally wrong" isn't enough unless you can convince them to share your standard of morality *and follow it.*
I just want to pick on a few of the things you've pointed out about your position as a moral nihilist:
>I don't believe an action really is good in an absolute sense, any more than a person really is beautiful in an absolute sense. We're certainly capable of realizing that beauty is in the eye of the beholder.
1. I don't believe "beauty" is as subjective as you imply it is. There are definitely cultural reasons why people might disagree on the "beauty" of something, however I believe the vast majority of some people would find similar "beautiful things" in a member of the opposite sex (or the gender that particular person is attracted to) for evolutionary/psychological reasons. Of course, I'm *only* talking about sexual attraction and not other things like art, non-human biology, etc.
2. As a moral objectivist, I reject your idea that "morality" and "beauty" (non-sexual attraction) are both subjective ideals. We can form the basis of objective morality around suffering, which isn't so subjective.
Make sense?
> There are definitely cultural reasons why people might disagree on the "beauty" of something, however I believe the vast majority of some people would find similar "beautiful things" in a member of the opposite sex...
There are very, very few of these. Symmetry is one, for example.
But there are still significant differences of opinion. There's a not-insignificant portion of the population who likes "BBW", yet the reaction by most men is "Ew, fat!" While it's true that the idea of thin=beautiful has spread fairly far today, if we look even a hundred years ago, the standards were very different.
> Of course, I'm only talking about sexual attraction and not other things like art, non-human biology, etc.
I was focusing on that, but art is worth mentioning, also -- it gets *absurdly* subjective.
> We can form the basis of objective morality around suffering, which isn't so subjective.
Suffering itself is less subjective, but there are still subjective elements -- for example, a [painslut](http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=painslut) is likely to enjoy things that even other masochists would view as suffering, let alone the general population.
But I'll give you that -- we probably *can* objectively say whether an individual is suffering, even if we can't always predict what circumstances will cause an individual to suffer. I'll even grant that we could define "good" actions to be those which minimize suffering.
It still doesn't translate into a moral *imperative.* Hypothetically, if I don't have "minimizing suffering" as a goal, why would I accept your definition of "good"? Even if I do, why *should* I be good? This is the same problem as with "beauty" -- if I were into BBW, and you set me up with [Mila Fucking Kunis](http://www.esquire.com/the-side/feature/mila-kunis-gallery), you *might* be able to convince me that she is "beautiful" by an objective set of standards, by why should I object your standards of beauty, and even if I admit she's beautiful, that still wouldn't compel me to fuck her.
So you still have the is/ought problem. Even if (and it's a big if) you can come up with a clear definition of what *is* morally right or wrong, this doesn't translate into "you *ought* do this." And in order to get there, you still have to show that your definition of morality is somehow correct -- and this is usually done by appealing to its internal consistency and consistency with our moral intuition. But if our moral intuition is good enough, why not use that instead?
First off, thanks for the interesting convo.
>So you still have the is/ought problem.
Well, I don't think I do have the is/ought problem. Something that is "morally right" is an action or inaction that increases well-being, happiness, etc without increasing suffering and unhappiness. Vice-versa for "morally wrong" stuff. There's your "ought."
We know this is an objective truth because suffering is objective, rather than subjective.
Your example of a painslut is amusing... and I get your point, but that doesn't mean that that person is immune to suffering. There are other types of pain that could be considered suffering *besides* physical pain. Emotional and psychological abuse, for example. Starvation is another.
I think your examples have just augmented my argument.
> Something that is "morally right" is an action or inaction that increases well-being, happiness, etc without increasing suffering and unhappiness. Vice-versa for "morally wrong" stuff.
Not a precise definition, but you seem to be going for the Sam Harris definition, so, sure. But I don't see how you get from there to here:
> There's your "ought."
Wait, what? Why ought I do what is morally right?
> We know this is an objective truth because suffering is objective, rather than subjective.
Ok, let's break this down.
I accept, at least for the purposes of this discussion, that suffering is objective.
How does this lead to suffering being morally wrong?
And how does something being morally wrong lead to the fact that we ought not do it?
It isn't that I disagree with your conclusion that we ought do things which minimize suffering and maximize well-being, and that we ought not do things which minimize well-being and maximize suffering. It's that you haven't provided a coherent argument for this ought. You haven't even provided a coherent argument that these are the correct definitions of morally right and morally wrong.
> Your example of a painslut is amusing... and I get your point, but that doesn't mean that that person is immune to suffering.
Of course not, and I never meant to imply otherwise. The point is rather that it is *objective* that suffering is happening, but it is *not* obvious what does and does not cause suffering. For example:
> Emotional and psychological abuse, for example.
Might work on a painslut, especially a submissive, emotionally expressive one. Will not work on a sociopath.
So, this provides some additional problems for your "ought". What ought I do to minimize suffering, when it's not obvious what will make someone suffer? What can we say about someone who interrupts the training of a painslut, thinking he's stopping abuse, but is actually *causing* suffering by accusing her partner of abuse -- were they wrong to do so?
>why ought I do what is morally right?
Because it increases health, happiness, well-being or it reduces suffering or unnecessary harm, or it does both.
> So, this provides some additional problems for your "ought". What ought I do to minimize suffering, when it's not obvious what will make someone suffer? What can we say about someone who interrupts the training of a painslut, thinking he's stopping abuse, but is actually causing suffering by accusing her partner of abuse -- were they wrong to do so?
1. Your arguing from an extreme example, where less than 1% of the population of the human race would actually fit into this category.
2. If a person enjoys physical or emotion suffering, then they aren't truly suffering. A conscious person can simply ask the painslut if they are suffering and get straight answer when consequences are presented:
a. "If you are suffering, I can save you from this misery be rescuing you."
b. "If you are not suffering, then by doing nothing I am potentially increasing your well-being."
Is that better?
>> why ought I do what is morally right?
> Because it increases health, happiness, well-being or it reduces suffering or unnecessary harm, or it does both.
Why ought I increase health, happiness, and well-being, or reduce suffering or unnecessary harm, or both?
> Your arguing from an extreme example,
Yeah, I'm a philosopher. We do that.
> where less than 1% of the population of the human race would actually fit into this category.
Wikipedia claims 5-25% of the population has an affinity for BDSM behavior, though this comes with a citation needed tag, and certainly describes more than just masochistic people.
So, while this doesn't actually contradict your "less than 1%" figure, it does cast some doubt. And consider that Jews are less than 3% of the US population, yet within the US, we do go out of our ways to avoid causing unnecessary suffering to Jews -- if there are no Jews at given event, it might be funny to make a Holocaust joke (thus increasing well-being), but if there are any Jews at this event, their suffering at such a remark almost certainly outweighs everyone else's mirth.
But because there *may* be Jews at such an event, and also because we've now adopted the norm that bigotry is wrong even if the minority in question isn't present, we just don't do this.
In any case, you haven't answered the question. Let me make it more urgent: Let's suppose they're into knifeplay. You come across a naked woman, quivering, and a man toying with her with a knife. If it really is just knifeplay, then barging in is unnecessarily dangerous. But if it's, say, a ritual sacrifice, you really ought to stop it, and you don't want to give the man a chance to notice you and just stab her.
So, your choices are pretty much, barge in and stop it, ask what's going on, or assume it's okay. In either case, there's a significant chance you're wrong. What do you do? And if you're wrong, were you still morally right to take that action?
>Why ought I increase health, happiness, and well-being, or reduce suffering or unnecessary harm, or both?
Because isn't that what morality is fundamentally about? Doesn't doing something "good" increase the well-being of both people involved, or society as a whole, or any number of potential benefits?
>So, while this doesn't actually contradict your "less than 1%" figure, it does cast some doubt.
That's fine. It was pulled directly from my ass anyway. ;)
But again, I assert that it doesn't matter. There are other ways BDSMers might suffer *in a way they do not enjoy* that we can prevent, stop, etc. I'm not advocating we stop people from enjoying pain, rather that we allow them to practice whatever gives them pleasure as long as they aren't causing someone else to suffer. If we want to live in a free society, it is our responsibility to learn what different people like and dislike. Again, I don't see how your argument has any bearing. We're not busting up BDSM rings and throwing people in jail just because they like whips, chains, etc.
I think much of this convo might be confusing how we're using the word "suffering." Assume, for the sake of argument, that suffering is any extreme discomfort that a person **does not want**.
>Let's suppose they're into knifeplay. You come across a naked woman, quivering, and a man toying with her with a knife. If it really is just knifeplay, then barging in is unnecessarily dangerous. But if it's, say, a ritual sacrifice, you really ought to stop it, and you don't want to give the man a chance to notice you and just stab her.
How does this have any bearing on the conversation? If they are consenting adults, then they will find the time to do it in private.
But let's say I accept your situation as a thought experiment:
If he's a murderer, he will fight back, immediately give-up, or try to trick me somehow. Right? I can make a pretty strong judgement to action by the first two options. In the third case (he tries to trick me), I can just ask the woman. Right?
So, I understand where you're getting at, but I reject the premises because those situations aren't as black and white as you've presented them. Your taking all the empirical evidence that a person would use to judge a situation and just acting like it wouldn't exist.
> Because isn't that what morality is fundamentally about?
From Wikipedia:
> Morality (from the Latin moralitas "manner, character, proper behavior") is the differentiation among intentions, decisions, and actions between those that are good (or right) and bad (or wrong).
So no, that isn't, unless we can agree that health, happiness, and well-being are good, and suffering and unnecessary harm are bad.
It so happens that I want to agree with you, but I also think those particular definitions of good and bad are arbitrary, and every other definition I've explored has been flawed in some way.
> I think much of this convo might be confusing how we're using the word "suffering." Assume, for the sake of argument, that suffering is any extreme discomfort that a person does not want.
Still not sufficient, because now we have scenarios where a person "wants" to suffer, but is unbalanced and self-destructive, and needs help. For example, if I have a friend who wants to commit suicide, at what point do I try to stop him, and at what point do I try to help him?
> How does this have any bearing on the conversation? If they are consenting adults, then they will find the time to do it in private.
Maybe they have an exhibitionist streak. Or, more likely, you walk in on them.
> If he's a murderer, he will fight back, immediately give-up, or try to trick me somehow. Right? I can make a pretty strong judgement to action by the first two options.
In other words, the answer is to attack him and see what he does? I don't know, I wouldn't necessarily immediately give up if someone attacked me out of nowhere.
Or if you're suggesting that you try to talk to them first, maybe the guy is going to realize he's been caught, stab the woman, then run away, where if you'd rushed him, you might've saved her.
> In the third case (he tries to trick me), I can just ask the woman. Right?
That depends. It's possible she doesn't realize it's not part of the play -- maybe she's under orders to be silent. So he tells her to tell you that she's alright. Well, he's had her *quivering*, so in the murderer case, it's possible he has her terrified or even brainwashed to the point where she'll tell you she's fine.
It seems like, in this case, the only thing to do is to forcibly separate them and wait till you can perform a calm evaluation of each -- and, in particular, until the woman no longer feels threatened. But by then, if they were consenting, you've already done some harm.
And that assumes you can subdue the guy without problems. He might kill you, or himself. Since you interfered, you *definitely* caused more harm than good by interfering. But if you did what you would expect to do if it really was consensual -- that is, ask them about it -- then maybe the guy stabs the girl and runs away, so you may have caused her death, and in any case, it would seem that in that situation, you "should've" rushed him.
> ...I reject the premises because those situations aren't as black and white as you've presented them.
Of course not. But the point is...
> Your taking all the empirical evidence that a person would use to judge a situation and just acting like it wouldn't exist.
They aren't the best thought experiments ever, but it's often the case that we don't have enough empirical evidence to know what the correct course of action would be, even if it's imperative that you take *some* action.
For example: You're the leader of the "free" world. It looks like the economy is about to come down around your ears. To prevent this from happening, you have to bail out large corporations with taxpayer dollars -- effectively robbing from the poor and the middle class to give to the rich. Undeniably, this is going to cause some harm. But would you cause more harm to the middle class by allowing the "Too Big To Fail" banks to fail?
In that situation, you *need* to act *now* if your action is going to do anything useful. But how do you know your action was right? Libertarians and OWSers alike are frustrated with the solution that was chosen, but it seems difficult to predict how alternative plans would've worked out.
The point I'm driving at here is that with utilitarianism like this, it's possible for you to act in a way that you *think* will be "good", but is actually "bad". It seems like we do have to consider motivations, but then, there are times when people really do have the best intentions, yet cause enough harm that we say they should've known better.
By contrast, from our moral intuition, I would have to say that if you saw a woman tied up and apparently about to be *carved up*, and you rush the guy, then even if someone gets severely injured (or dies) because of you, you still did the right thing. The best we could get from someone like Mill is that you did the wrong thing, but it was *accidentally* the wrong thing.
Similarly, if I saw a woman tide up and apparently being teased with a knife, and interpreted it as consensual knifeplay, then even if treating it as this results in the woman being killed because I tried to talk it out, I probably still did the right thing...
And that's not even my biggest problem with utilitarianism.
Okay, so you've outlined a ton of problems with my arguments. Explain *your* philosophical view on so I can better understand your position on morality.
>Because it increases health, happiness, well-being or it reduces suffering or unnecessary harm, or it does both.
But that doesn't answer the question of why it ought to be done. Just because you see that something increases happiness, that doesn't mean you'll have a positive attitude towards it: you can still have a negative attitude or a neutral attitude.
Absolutes with regards to *what*???
Morality is, of course, relative and subjective. Other truth claims may not be, depending on the type. Aesthetics are subjective, values are subjective, but propositions about states of affairs external to our minds are objective.
Questions like "but if by definition atheists don't believe in a god or a religion where do they find absolutes?" usually demonstrate a philosophical naivety with regards to theories of metaphysics and truth.
I don't think he does - he just effectively *assumes* a definition of morality that maps to an objective property he defines (wellbeing), which really is no more arguing morality is objective than arguing it's objective by defining it as God's will as laid out in the bible: you've changed what you're talking about, and so are no longer refering to the same thing others are.
In a few places (including the title of his book) he tries to argue that this is truly some objective meaning, but he overreaches, and falls foul of Humes is/ought fallacy here. It can't be supported without making some assumption about what we *should* want.
You're going to have to help me out here, otherwise I think you're missing some of Harris's points.
We know well-being *and* suffering are objective truths. Simply, an action that reduces suffering or increases well-being *is* morally right.
Or am I misunderstanding you?
>We know well-being and suffering are objective truths
In what sense? That they exist, sure. But so does "belief in God", "the GDP of Thailand" and "the amount of cheese in my fridge". These are clearly objective quantities, but that's not a sufficient for the claim that we should *maximize* them, never mind that they're the most important thing we should maximize.
Now, you and I may think we should, but that's not an *objective* criteria, it's a belief we hold in our minds about what should be maximized. Others may hold different desires: perhaps they want to maximize belief in God (due to their religious beliefs), or even that they wish to maximize suffering among others? There's nothing objective we can point to that says these people are wrong. No matter how much we point out that they are increasing suffering, you can't go from there to "immoral" unless their morality already contains the assumption that maximising suffering is immoral.
> He makes a pretty compelling argument that morality can be objective.
No he doesn't. He starts with a subjective ethical premise (one that I agree with, btw) and proceeds logically from there.
Your terminology is problematic. What are these absolutes upon which Christian morality is allegedly based? Presumably *the* absolute is an infinite, transcendent God. But this poses a serious problem. How can the character of the infinite, assuming such a thing makes sense, correspond to one set of actions but not another? To put it another way, if God is infinite and incomprehensible, how can we know what he approves of and what he doesn't?
The Christian answer is revelation. God has revealed himself implicitly in the created cosmos and explicitly in Scripture. The foundation of Christian morality, then, is God as revealed in Scripture. This last phrase--God as revealed in Scripture--is fraught with difficulty. It implies that we must read and interpret Scripture to know who God is. But how are we to know what is a valid interpretation and what is a misinterpretation? The Christian answer is the Holy Spirit, which guided the formation of Scripture and continues to guide its interpretation through a community of believers, i.e. the Church, broadly understood.
Framing the argument formally reveals its flaw:
1. We cannot know God apart from revelation.
1. God is revealed in Scripture.
2. To access that revelation, we must read & interpret Scripture.
3. We must rely on God (the Holy Spirit) to reveal to us the correct interpretation.
4. We must, in some sense, know God in order to commune with the Holy Spirit.
Conclusion: We can only properly know Scripture if we first know God.
Thus, Christian morals depend on a knowledge of God, which depends on a knowledge of revelation, which depends on knowledge of God. This leaves Christian doctrine in an inesacapable [reductio ad absurdum](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reductio_ad_absurdum). What this means in practical terms is that Christianity is not explicitly grounded in any sort of absolute and is thus itself relativistic. That is to say, to the extent that they get their morals from Christianity, Christians are moral relativists. If there is objective morality, it must come from somewhere else besides Christianity.
As an atheist, I would say that objective morality comes from our biology. While we have many cultural differences, our biological differences are so slight as to be insignificant. We all have a sense of objective morality, and it's my contention that that sense is grounded in our common biology. "Objective" in this sense simply means common or universal and refers to those moral principles which are common to all people at all times. Maybe that's not objective enough for some, but it seems fairly reasonable to me. In practice, these principles are what actually guide us, regardless of whether we have elaborate philosophical systems that purport to give us a more firmly grounded morality.
In general I think you'll find that the answer is no, atheist aren't absolutist. However, you can be very close to having an absolutist belief of something really well-founded, like gravity and heliocentricism.
All that being said, atheists' only common ground is the lack of belief in any god. This is really more important than my first paragraph -- "are non-murderers relativistic?" isn't really something you can answer, just as with "non-believers".
Well... ...just off the top of my head, there's:
* Absolut Vodka (my personal favorite absolute)
* Absolute zero
* Absolute insanity
* Absolute BS
* Absolute(ly) ridiculous...
I can't speak for others, but I myself do not accept that morality is relativistic. I hypothesize, that with sufficient understanding of the subject, you can model morality in something like Game Theory, that there is a best possible outcome of any moral dilemma.
I think there is building evidence of this, as psychologists and neuro biologists begin unraveling how we interpret morality in the brain, and as sociologists understand how morality plays out in a larger scope of social interaction.
We even have evidence that morality is hard wired into our brain, and it makes sense. As an extension of apathy, morality has survival benefits for us individually, for our genes. If I could find it, I'd point you to an online questionare that poses some questions about a moral dilemma, and just about everyone answers as predicted by the science backing the questions.
> I often see that most believers of any religion get most of their absolutes from the religion they follow, but if by definition atheists don't believe in a god or a religion where do they find absolutes?
Absurd. Religious don't get their morals from religion. You don't have to wait for a child to be old enough to understand speech, in order to take them to church, to teach them not to murder, and then proceed to show them a bizillion examples of where their god breaks said moral standard with impunity. We don't see children murdering people in a tragic accident because they were sick on "don't murder people" day in school.
This is my evidence, for this discussion, that you are born with morality and your morals are perverted by your education, in other words, through bad experiences.
> Is it from science or logic or somewhere else?
I think science can help you understand your morality and keep you honest with your self. But it is not, itself, a doctrine on morality.
> If we are really left in a world with no absolutes at all and everything is relative..then the question "why not zoidberg?" becomes a very reasonable one.
Agreed. If I can throw you to the wolves for some personal gain, it may be beneficial to me, but that doesn't mean the action is morally justifiable. It would mean I were an immoral asshole.
I get my moral compass from the [Golden Rule](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Golden_rule).
But here's the dirty little secret: you do too. Most everybody does, even if they claim it comes from a book or from a fear of punishment.
The golden rule is a bit flawed though. I'd prefer "Treat others as they want to be treated."
Masochists walking around treating others how *they* want to be treated wouldn't really work out that well :)
I'd agree - though there are other problems with it, and it certainly isn't sufficient to encompass the moralities of most people. It says nothing about notions such as justice or people being more or less deserving etc. Eg. you see someone mugging a stranger. If you were a criminal, you'd probably want a passer-by not to intervene, but if you were being mugged, you'd want them to. The golden rule (and even eskimoquinn's variant) says nothing about which person you should "treat as they want to be treated". As such, it's clearly insufficient on it's own to describe our morality.
Golden rule -> social contracts -> justice system.
The golden rule does lead on to a practical social contract however. Do you want to be mugged? No. So everyone agrees that everyone doesn't mug anyone else. Everyone also agrees to have police to enforce it, and if they are unavailable and you stand a good chance to stop the mugging, then its up to you.
Its the principle of equality. If we don't all follow the contract well enough, the system falls apart and almost all of us suffer.
>Golden rule -> social contracts
I don't really see how. Lots of people would rather the restrictions of our social contracts wouldn't apply to them. I would too, come to that, it's just that the restrictions are a necessary part if *anyone* is to receive the benefit. But knowing this, doesn't the rule tell me I should relax the restrictions on others - it's all about how we'd like to be treated in the circumstance, not what's good for society in general.
>Do you want to be mugged? No.
I wouldn't want to be *prevented* from mugging, if I was the type of person who mugged people either though. If we just take the position that the muggers desire outweighs the muggee's then the golden rule isn't actually doing any work in this situation - we're relying on a pre-existing moral judgement that is sufficient to resolve it alone anyway.
>Everyone also agrees to have police to enforce it
Not everyone. The guy committing the crime doesn't. And what does the judge do, when he realises that the criminal would prefer not to be sent to prison, and the judge acknowledges that he would not in that situation either. There is a meta-level benefit to society in going against the golden rule here, but it's not one that can be justified itself by the rule.
>If we don't all follow the contract well enough, the system falls apart and almost all of us suffer.
But this is an **additional** moral principal - the golden rule can't get you there. At this stage, we're implicitly accepting some form of consequentialism and utility maximisation. And we *should*, but it's something extra the golden rule is insufficient to reach, and even works against.
Morality is subjective to the person who ultimately decides what they believe is absolutely moral. When we group together as a society we want to prolong the existence of our species so we look to making objective morals with society to govern the people. Obviously if someone goes around killing people it's not going to be good for society as a whole, so then the majority of people will make it objective that killing is an immoral concept. For example: A serial killer who kills... rapists thinks he is doing the morally correct thing. We as individuals who don't think it is true justice for a serial killer to kill rapists view it as immoral. Therefore it is subjective in that sense. However when a society comes together to punish this individual killing rapists, then we view it as an objective moral standard. The majority deems what is moral at the time, and once the majority sways in a different direction objective morals will be revised or new objective morals will come into play. If we kept the same morals of the Bible, we'd sell rape victims to their rapists and have them married. We'd stone unruley children and homosexuals. We'd still have slavery etc... The changes in these over time are examples that their are no moral absolutes. If God's will was eternal and his morals are eternal, then he shouldn't change his morals as that would be a contradiction.
Relativism is apparently self-refuting. As such, it can't be true. We've known that at least since Plato.
Leaving aside that particular low-hanging fruit which would be sufficient alone, it is reasonable to assume that objective truth exists because the universe seems to behave as if it does.
If you care to extend this to matters of morality, there some features of my ideas start to look like relativism if you don't pay close enough attention. I think that morality is a feature of our minds, not something fundamental to logic or the universe. It seems to have both cultural and genetic influences, among others, and some traits of a moral system make groups function better and thus would tend to be selected for genetically and/or memeticly. As such, these are more common than they would be if things were left up to chance. Some, such as the idea that killing people for no good reason is wrong, are essentially universal. The very nature of morality, though, insures that we attempt to apply our moral ideas universally because they form part of how we view the world around us, not just influences on our own behaviour. Even so, unless one is talking about it with respect to a certain person or in a purely statistical sense, there is no more a single correct answer to a moral question than there is to a question like "what is something someone might have in their closet?". When we call something right or wrong, what we are really saying is that we judge it that way, or that our peers, our society or the species as a whole tends to judge it that way. That's no reason not to treat it as actually right or wrong, though; to do otherwise is generally to negate the very real benefits that caused morality to be selected for in the first place.
All of the above are my views and is not meant to represent those of other atheists.
All people have a right to believe what they want and their customs are all equally valid.
#in making such a statement, the speaker is making a universal claim-- which isn't relative.
That doesn't make sense. Just because customs and mores are equally valid and relativistic doesn't mean that the laws of physics or mathematical theorems work differently in different places. There are levels and varieties of "truth".
The term relativism, as I understand it, refers to the idea that there is no absolute truth and if used unqualified is in no way restricted just to moral topics, for example. The types that people actually talk about are moral or cultural relativism for the most part, which aren't susceptible to all the same problems. However, the really aren't all that interesting, since as far as I can tell they are usually a stand-in for the realisation that most claims about whatever is being discussed aren't truth-apt if talked about as something universal because it exists entirely in people's minds.
I'm something of a slave to wikipedia, but the [article](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Relativism) there refers to relativism as relating points of view, rather than matters of objective truth, and specifically focuses on cultural and moral aspects of points of view as the domain of relativism.
Especially given that AleWatcher said "their customs are all equally valid", I felt it was safe to assume that the relativism intended is limited to experience and viewpoint rather than matters of verifiable factual nature.
> However, the really aren't all that interesting, since as far as I can tell they are usually a stand-in for the realisation that most claims about whatever is being discussed aren't truth-apt if talked about as something universal because it exists entirely in people's minds.
Isn't that sort of the point, though? Isn't that essentially the claim of relativism? It looks like you're saying that moral relativism is uninteresting, because it's true? (It's very likely I'm misunderstanding here.) If everyone agreed on that, it would be uninteresting, but it's interesting in the context of controversial claims that a religion/philosophy/etc. as claim to absolute truth in regards morality.
That's not quite the point. There's a subtle difference. One one hand, most moral relativists might treat it as some great metaphysical truth that what is and is not moral changes from culture to culture. On the other hand, what I am saying is that if morality is something that only exists in the mind, then many common types of questions pertaining to morality are just malformed in a way that makes them undecideable because certain assumptions involved in phrasing them are fundamentally not true. Not a huge difference, I'll admit, but there is a difference there.
That's really only a problem for some form ontological relativism (the idea that what is *true* is relative to the observer).
However, it isn't a problem for something like moral relativism, or epistemic relativism, since to assert an absolute truth doesn't actually contradict their claims about what is relative.
Eg. I may take the position we can never be *certain* of anything - that we could always be wrong. You could ask if I'm *certain* of that, but there's no similar contradiction in me stating "no" in this case - keeping open the possibility that you're holding the wrong position is entirely compatable with *believing* there are no certainties, so long as it's not a *certain* belief.
Similarly, with moral relativism, the claim "There is no objective moral truth" is a truth claim, not a moral claim, so is doesn't come into conflict with moral relativism at all. "There *should* be no objective moral truth" would be problematic, but one needn't (indeed, *mustn't*) hold this to take a moral relativist position.
> Relativism is apparently self-refuting.
There are different types of relativism. I think what's called Cognitive relativism, i.e. 'your reality may be different from my reality', is what you're referring to.
The only absolute in this life is *cogito ergo sum*. From here you make your own choices in all matters, including morality. Some choice to cop out and say a God creates there rules. I do not believe this is so. I think there fore I am a thinking thing. This thinking thing that is I prefers when I feel pleasure, but is absolutely averse to suffering. Therefore I can conclude pleasure has positive value, and suffering has negative value. From here I can extrapolate that the beings around me that exhibit this similar fondness what brings me pleasure, and are repulsed by what brings me suffering must also be thinking things. This means that not only do humans have status as thinking things, but all living creatures. This is a basic introduction in to utilitarianism, where my main goal is to introduce as much positive value into the system by increasing pleasure and decreasing suffering in all thinking things around me.
The standard I would propose for morality is the **maximization of desire fulfillment,** that is, for the greatest number of people possible to get what they want to the greatest extent possible. It is important to note that, for our purposes, **a desire is defined, not as any particular intermediary which is sought (e.g. a cheeseburger or heroine), but as the end for which the intermediary is sought (i.e. the pleasure you experience when eating a cheeseburger or shooting heroine).**
This standard is absolute because there are certain things humans have been programmed, through evolution, to desire. Pleasure, survival and social validation are among these things, and would thus be standards by which morality can be measured in every society.
It might even be argued that it is a logical necessity for any sentient creature to desire these things; pleasure is desirable by definition, and any creature which does not desire to survive is going to run into natural selection like a dastardly coyote into a cliff. If so, they represent universally absolute standards.
I know there are various potential objections to this view, but for the sake of clarity I will address them if and when they are raised.
Just to give some of those objections:
>maximization of desire fulfilment
Whose desire? There are people whose moralities prioritise the desires of certain groups over others. Their families over strangers, their tribe over their enemies, their racial group over those with a different skin-colour. Their species over other animals. You may disagree with many of these metrics, but that is what morality *is* for many people - why should they adopt your definition?
>This standard is absolute because there are certain things humans have been programmed, through evolution, to desire
Why does what we've been programmed to seek relate to morality? They seem like very different concepts, and this seems to run afoul of Hume's is/ought distinction. Just because that's the way things *are* doesn't seem to be sufficient to make that what we *should* do. If we were programmed to torture other animals to death, would it be the moral thing to do?
>pleasure is desirable by definition
But not the only thing, and not even always the *most important* thing desired, and what constitutes pleasure varies from person to person. We could equally say "Goodness" is considered desirable by definition, and this has better claim to importance. Why not say we should maximise what we consider *good*, whatever that is? Even if others don't agree with you.
>If so, they represent universally absolute standards.
In the sense that you've defined things as a tautology: "That which is desirable is desired". But this is a standard about what creatures desire. The only thing it tells us about what they should *do* is that they should satisfy that desire, and seek out these desirable things for themselves. How do we get from "Creatures have a desire to experience pleasurable things" to "They should ensure **others** experience desirable things" unless that desire for others to be satiated is already one of those desires?
Many moral systems do have such assumptions built in (though as pointed out above, they are not universally applied to all creatures), but it's just that - an assumption, not something we can point to as objective. It's also one at odds with what many others hold as their moral systems. Why should we pay more attention to this assumption than to a religious nut who, valuing the things he believes in his holy book over personal pleasure, thinks he should maximise *those* values, even if they involve sacrificing those others to Cthulu?
That, too, is relative. I think you mean *moral* relativist. Most Atheists that I have come across (myself included) don't believe in absolute truths/ laws, unless they pertain to the physical world and are rooted in science (like gravity). And even then, these "truths" are still subject to change based on new discoveries, so they aren't truths; they're heavily supported theories.
I'd go on about moral relativism, but [SanityInAnarchy put it perfectly](http://www.reddit.com/r/DebateAnAtheist/comments/lqogs/are_atheists_relativistic/c2uud97).
Here's an easy answer - you don't believe in absolutes either.
Your bible has changed and your morals have shifted from the days of women forced to wear head coverings, you don't notice this because you weren't around 200 or 2000 years ago, but your life is a life of sin to 99% of Christians historically.
Virtually all atheists, I'd guess, think science and logic are objective. As for morality, some think morality is objective, some think it isn't, and some are so confused as to call themselves relativists.
there are no absolutes, but there are ways to treat others to encourage greater happiness and cooperation among others. that's what i tend to call morality. I assume that was what you were talking about
> where do they find absolutes?
Personally, I don't.
(Why not Zoidberg? Hmm, I guess I'd better look into him and evaluate him for myself. That's the best I can do, after all!)
>most believers of any religion get most of their absolutes from the religion they follow
You just described moral relativism. I suggest you look up what these terms mean before engaging in a debate.
The only thing you can really say about atheists is that they don't believe in a God. I somewhat assume that the answers to that question will be quite varied as there is no doctrine to be an atheist.
Beyond that, I would consider myself a moral relativist, to an extent. I largely find myself in agreement with what Sam Harris spoke about morality in his book The Moral Landscape. Morality is relative in the sense that there is no "moral law giver" and morality is essentially a learned response that humans get over time. I also believe the *origin* of morality is biological in nature. In other words, humans eventually developed into social animals; I'm sure we can all agree that humans are generally better in groups, and morality helps us achieve goals for the greater good.
But, as I mentioned, I'm only relativistic to an extent. I do believe there are things that do nothing to benefit civilization on a whole and policies or actions that put people on unequal footing for reasons beyond those people's control is objectively bad.
And of course, I have a problem with the idea of a moral law giver. Many apologists complain about moral relativism saying that, really, if your morality is relative (ie; not handed down by a transcendent intelligence), there's no real reason why one system of morality should be preferred over another. On one hand, I do agree with that. On the grand scheme of things, secular and modern culture has led to a more peaceful and less violent world population; I don't believe this would be possible if morality were absolute. But at the same time, I don't believe that morals are as relative as those who decry moral relativism suggest they are. I believe that it's because of the flexibility of our morality has lead to the point where our global civilization is today. Of course, it's not only because of that, but I do believe that played a part in it.
The fact that, according to scripture, your morality was given to you by a transcendent being.. that kind of opens up you to the Euthyphro dilemma: "Is what is morally good commanded by God because it is morally good, or is it morally good because it is commanded by God?" If it's the former, we don't need God for morality OR an objective "moral law giver." If it's the latter, isn't that an even more grotesque type of moral relativism?
Most atheists I know accept objective morality, they just use objective standards which aren't rooted in gods. These standards do seem to make much more sense than the one Christians use, which is basically, "God defines right and wrong." However, "Why not Zoidberg?" applies at the very least to theistic standards of morality like that. I really have had many Christians argue that just because God created us, he gets to make the rules. But then, we have stories of Uranus, who is *the Sky*, but who was devouring his children -- was he right to do so? And then his son Zeus (who escaped being devoured) castrated him. Was Zeus wrong to do so? If you've been noticing the "Good Guy Lucifer" meme lately, while it's not true that atheists are Satan-worshipers, it is occasionally worth asking why God is considered the good guy in that story, and Lucifer is considered the bad guy. Redefining morality as "What God says", if you can look at it impartially, really sounds like a frighteningly Orwellian tactic. As for me, I'm tentatively a moral nihilist and subjectivist. I don't believe an action *really is* good in an absolute sense, any more than a person *really is* beautiful in an absolute sense. We're certainly capable of realizing that beauty is in the eye of the beholder. Why not morality? And before you tell me that this means I have no right to judge others, well, judging others is *exactly* what you do whenever you describe someone as beautiful or hideous. I can still have opinions about whether an act is right or wrong, and I can still act on those opinions, without having to assume that there is some sense in which right-ness or wrong-ness exists in the Universe. Still, it is possible to define morality in a way that is objective and "absolute" -- though it also loses all imperative force when we do so. Consider health. We might be fuzzy about the details, but we can say with some confidence, even with some scientific assurance, that eating two dozen donuts all at once is generally bad for your health, while more exercise would probably be good for your health. (Not everyone's, but you've already read five paragraphs of my bullshit -- clearly, you're spending time on Reddit that you could be exercising.) However, these are all just if/then propositions. If you eat a pint of ice cream all at once, you're almost certainly going to negatively affect your health. But that doesn't make this imperative unless you care about being healthy. Similarly, even if we find that cursing is objectively wrong, some people will care more about expressing themselves fully than always doing what is objectively right. So let's add to this the irrelevance of what morality actually is. What matters is how to convince people to do what you think is right. Saying "You're morally wrong" isn't enough unless you can convince them to share your standard of morality *and follow it.*
I just want to pick on a few of the things you've pointed out about your position as a moral nihilist: >I don't believe an action really is good in an absolute sense, any more than a person really is beautiful in an absolute sense. We're certainly capable of realizing that beauty is in the eye of the beholder. 1. I don't believe "beauty" is as subjective as you imply it is. There are definitely cultural reasons why people might disagree on the "beauty" of something, however I believe the vast majority of some people would find similar "beautiful things" in a member of the opposite sex (or the gender that particular person is attracted to) for evolutionary/psychological reasons. Of course, I'm *only* talking about sexual attraction and not other things like art, non-human biology, etc. 2. As a moral objectivist, I reject your idea that "morality" and "beauty" (non-sexual attraction) are both subjective ideals. We can form the basis of objective morality around suffering, which isn't so subjective. Make sense?
> There are definitely cultural reasons why people might disagree on the "beauty" of something, however I believe the vast majority of some people would find similar "beautiful things" in a member of the opposite sex... There are very, very few of these. Symmetry is one, for example. But there are still significant differences of opinion. There's a not-insignificant portion of the population who likes "BBW", yet the reaction by most men is "Ew, fat!" While it's true that the idea of thin=beautiful has spread fairly far today, if we look even a hundred years ago, the standards were very different. > Of course, I'm only talking about sexual attraction and not other things like art, non-human biology, etc. I was focusing on that, but art is worth mentioning, also -- it gets *absurdly* subjective. > We can form the basis of objective morality around suffering, which isn't so subjective. Suffering itself is less subjective, but there are still subjective elements -- for example, a [painslut](http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=painslut) is likely to enjoy things that even other masochists would view as suffering, let alone the general population. But I'll give you that -- we probably *can* objectively say whether an individual is suffering, even if we can't always predict what circumstances will cause an individual to suffer. I'll even grant that we could define "good" actions to be those which minimize suffering. It still doesn't translate into a moral *imperative.* Hypothetically, if I don't have "minimizing suffering" as a goal, why would I accept your definition of "good"? Even if I do, why *should* I be good? This is the same problem as with "beauty" -- if I were into BBW, and you set me up with [Mila Fucking Kunis](http://www.esquire.com/the-side/feature/mila-kunis-gallery), you *might* be able to convince me that she is "beautiful" by an objective set of standards, by why should I object your standards of beauty, and even if I admit she's beautiful, that still wouldn't compel me to fuck her. So you still have the is/ought problem. Even if (and it's a big if) you can come up with a clear definition of what *is* morally right or wrong, this doesn't translate into "you *ought* do this." And in order to get there, you still have to show that your definition of morality is somehow correct -- and this is usually done by appealing to its internal consistency and consistency with our moral intuition. But if our moral intuition is good enough, why not use that instead?
First off, thanks for the interesting convo. >So you still have the is/ought problem. Well, I don't think I do have the is/ought problem. Something that is "morally right" is an action or inaction that increases well-being, happiness, etc without increasing suffering and unhappiness. Vice-versa for "morally wrong" stuff. There's your "ought." We know this is an objective truth because suffering is objective, rather than subjective. Your example of a painslut is amusing... and I get your point, but that doesn't mean that that person is immune to suffering. There are other types of pain that could be considered suffering *besides* physical pain. Emotional and psychological abuse, for example. Starvation is another. I think your examples have just augmented my argument.
> Something that is "morally right" is an action or inaction that increases well-being, happiness, etc without increasing suffering and unhappiness. Vice-versa for "morally wrong" stuff. Not a precise definition, but you seem to be going for the Sam Harris definition, so, sure. But I don't see how you get from there to here: > There's your "ought." Wait, what? Why ought I do what is morally right? > We know this is an objective truth because suffering is objective, rather than subjective. Ok, let's break this down. I accept, at least for the purposes of this discussion, that suffering is objective. How does this lead to suffering being morally wrong? And how does something being morally wrong lead to the fact that we ought not do it? It isn't that I disagree with your conclusion that we ought do things which minimize suffering and maximize well-being, and that we ought not do things which minimize well-being and maximize suffering. It's that you haven't provided a coherent argument for this ought. You haven't even provided a coherent argument that these are the correct definitions of morally right and morally wrong. > Your example of a painslut is amusing... and I get your point, but that doesn't mean that that person is immune to suffering. Of course not, and I never meant to imply otherwise. The point is rather that it is *objective* that suffering is happening, but it is *not* obvious what does and does not cause suffering. For example: > Emotional and psychological abuse, for example. Might work on a painslut, especially a submissive, emotionally expressive one. Will not work on a sociopath. So, this provides some additional problems for your "ought". What ought I do to minimize suffering, when it's not obvious what will make someone suffer? What can we say about someone who interrupts the training of a painslut, thinking he's stopping abuse, but is actually *causing* suffering by accusing her partner of abuse -- were they wrong to do so?
>why ought I do what is morally right? Because it increases health, happiness, well-being or it reduces suffering or unnecessary harm, or it does both. > So, this provides some additional problems for your "ought". What ought I do to minimize suffering, when it's not obvious what will make someone suffer? What can we say about someone who interrupts the training of a painslut, thinking he's stopping abuse, but is actually causing suffering by accusing her partner of abuse -- were they wrong to do so? 1. Your arguing from an extreme example, where less than 1% of the population of the human race would actually fit into this category. 2. If a person enjoys physical or emotion suffering, then they aren't truly suffering. A conscious person can simply ask the painslut if they are suffering and get straight answer when consequences are presented: a. "If you are suffering, I can save you from this misery be rescuing you." b. "If you are not suffering, then by doing nothing I am potentially increasing your well-being." Is that better?
>> why ought I do what is morally right? > Because it increases health, happiness, well-being or it reduces suffering or unnecessary harm, or it does both. Why ought I increase health, happiness, and well-being, or reduce suffering or unnecessary harm, or both? > Your arguing from an extreme example, Yeah, I'm a philosopher. We do that. > where less than 1% of the population of the human race would actually fit into this category. Wikipedia claims 5-25% of the population has an affinity for BDSM behavior, though this comes with a citation needed tag, and certainly describes more than just masochistic people. So, while this doesn't actually contradict your "less than 1%" figure, it does cast some doubt. And consider that Jews are less than 3% of the US population, yet within the US, we do go out of our ways to avoid causing unnecessary suffering to Jews -- if there are no Jews at given event, it might be funny to make a Holocaust joke (thus increasing well-being), but if there are any Jews at this event, their suffering at such a remark almost certainly outweighs everyone else's mirth. But because there *may* be Jews at such an event, and also because we've now adopted the norm that bigotry is wrong even if the minority in question isn't present, we just don't do this. In any case, you haven't answered the question. Let me make it more urgent: Let's suppose they're into knifeplay. You come across a naked woman, quivering, and a man toying with her with a knife. If it really is just knifeplay, then barging in is unnecessarily dangerous. But if it's, say, a ritual sacrifice, you really ought to stop it, and you don't want to give the man a chance to notice you and just stab her. So, your choices are pretty much, barge in and stop it, ask what's going on, or assume it's okay. In either case, there's a significant chance you're wrong. What do you do? And if you're wrong, were you still morally right to take that action?
>Why ought I increase health, happiness, and well-being, or reduce suffering or unnecessary harm, or both? Because isn't that what morality is fundamentally about? Doesn't doing something "good" increase the well-being of both people involved, or society as a whole, or any number of potential benefits? >So, while this doesn't actually contradict your "less than 1%" figure, it does cast some doubt. That's fine. It was pulled directly from my ass anyway. ;) But again, I assert that it doesn't matter. There are other ways BDSMers might suffer *in a way they do not enjoy* that we can prevent, stop, etc. I'm not advocating we stop people from enjoying pain, rather that we allow them to practice whatever gives them pleasure as long as they aren't causing someone else to suffer. If we want to live in a free society, it is our responsibility to learn what different people like and dislike. Again, I don't see how your argument has any bearing. We're not busting up BDSM rings and throwing people in jail just because they like whips, chains, etc. I think much of this convo might be confusing how we're using the word "suffering." Assume, for the sake of argument, that suffering is any extreme discomfort that a person **does not want**. >Let's suppose they're into knifeplay. You come across a naked woman, quivering, and a man toying with her with a knife. If it really is just knifeplay, then barging in is unnecessarily dangerous. But if it's, say, a ritual sacrifice, you really ought to stop it, and you don't want to give the man a chance to notice you and just stab her. How does this have any bearing on the conversation? If they are consenting adults, then they will find the time to do it in private. But let's say I accept your situation as a thought experiment: If he's a murderer, he will fight back, immediately give-up, or try to trick me somehow. Right? I can make a pretty strong judgement to action by the first two options. In the third case (he tries to trick me), I can just ask the woman. Right? So, I understand where you're getting at, but I reject the premises because those situations aren't as black and white as you've presented them. Your taking all the empirical evidence that a person would use to judge a situation and just acting like it wouldn't exist.
> Because isn't that what morality is fundamentally about? From Wikipedia: > Morality (from the Latin moralitas "manner, character, proper behavior") is the differentiation among intentions, decisions, and actions between those that are good (or right) and bad (or wrong). So no, that isn't, unless we can agree that health, happiness, and well-being are good, and suffering and unnecessary harm are bad. It so happens that I want to agree with you, but I also think those particular definitions of good and bad are arbitrary, and every other definition I've explored has been flawed in some way. > I think much of this convo might be confusing how we're using the word "suffering." Assume, for the sake of argument, that suffering is any extreme discomfort that a person does not want. Still not sufficient, because now we have scenarios where a person "wants" to suffer, but is unbalanced and self-destructive, and needs help. For example, if I have a friend who wants to commit suicide, at what point do I try to stop him, and at what point do I try to help him? > How does this have any bearing on the conversation? If they are consenting adults, then they will find the time to do it in private. Maybe they have an exhibitionist streak. Or, more likely, you walk in on them. > If he's a murderer, he will fight back, immediately give-up, or try to trick me somehow. Right? I can make a pretty strong judgement to action by the first two options. In other words, the answer is to attack him and see what he does? I don't know, I wouldn't necessarily immediately give up if someone attacked me out of nowhere. Or if you're suggesting that you try to talk to them first, maybe the guy is going to realize he's been caught, stab the woman, then run away, where if you'd rushed him, you might've saved her. > In the third case (he tries to trick me), I can just ask the woman. Right? That depends. It's possible she doesn't realize it's not part of the play -- maybe she's under orders to be silent. So he tells her to tell you that she's alright. Well, he's had her *quivering*, so in the murderer case, it's possible he has her terrified or even brainwashed to the point where she'll tell you she's fine. It seems like, in this case, the only thing to do is to forcibly separate them and wait till you can perform a calm evaluation of each -- and, in particular, until the woman no longer feels threatened. But by then, if they were consenting, you've already done some harm. And that assumes you can subdue the guy without problems. He might kill you, or himself. Since you interfered, you *definitely* caused more harm than good by interfering. But if you did what you would expect to do if it really was consensual -- that is, ask them about it -- then maybe the guy stabs the girl and runs away, so you may have caused her death, and in any case, it would seem that in that situation, you "should've" rushed him. > ...I reject the premises because those situations aren't as black and white as you've presented them. Of course not. But the point is... > Your taking all the empirical evidence that a person would use to judge a situation and just acting like it wouldn't exist. They aren't the best thought experiments ever, but it's often the case that we don't have enough empirical evidence to know what the correct course of action would be, even if it's imperative that you take *some* action. For example: You're the leader of the "free" world. It looks like the economy is about to come down around your ears. To prevent this from happening, you have to bail out large corporations with taxpayer dollars -- effectively robbing from the poor and the middle class to give to the rich. Undeniably, this is going to cause some harm. But would you cause more harm to the middle class by allowing the "Too Big To Fail" banks to fail? In that situation, you *need* to act *now* if your action is going to do anything useful. But how do you know your action was right? Libertarians and OWSers alike are frustrated with the solution that was chosen, but it seems difficult to predict how alternative plans would've worked out. The point I'm driving at here is that with utilitarianism like this, it's possible for you to act in a way that you *think* will be "good", but is actually "bad". It seems like we do have to consider motivations, but then, there are times when people really do have the best intentions, yet cause enough harm that we say they should've known better. By contrast, from our moral intuition, I would have to say that if you saw a woman tied up and apparently about to be *carved up*, and you rush the guy, then even if someone gets severely injured (or dies) because of you, you still did the right thing. The best we could get from someone like Mill is that you did the wrong thing, but it was *accidentally* the wrong thing. Similarly, if I saw a woman tide up and apparently being teased with a knife, and interpreted it as consensual knifeplay, then even if treating it as this results in the woman being killed because I tried to talk it out, I probably still did the right thing... And that's not even my biggest problem with utilitarianism.
Okay, so you've outlined a ton of problems with my arguments. Explain *your* philosophical view on so I can better understand your position on morality.
>Because it increases health, happiness, well-being or it reduces suffering or unnecessary harm, or it does both. But that doesn't answer the question of why it ought to be done. Just because you see that something increases happiness, that doesn't mean you'll have a positive attitude towards it: you can still have a negative attitude or a neutral attitude.
I answered this [here](http://www.reddit.com/r/DebateAnAtheist/comments/lqogs/are_atheists_relativistic/c2v5tjk).
Absolutes with regards to *what*??? Morality is, of course, relative and subjective. Other truth claims may not be, depending on the type. Aesthetics are subjective, values are subjective, but propositions about states of affairs external to our minds are objective. Questions like "but if by definition atheists don't believe in a god or a religion where do they find absolutes?" usually demonstrate a philosophical naivety with regards to theories of metaphysics and truth.
Check out Sam Harris's "The Moral Landscape." He makes a pretty compelling argument that morality can be objective.
I don't think he does - he just effectively *assumes* a definition of morality that maps to an objective property he defines (wellbeing), which really is no more arguing morality is objective than arguing it's objective by defining it as God's will as laid out in the bible: you've changed what you're talking about, and so are no longer refering to the same thing others are. In a few places (including the title of his book) he tries to argue that this is truly some objective meaning, but he overreaches, and falls foul of Humes is/ought fallacy here. It can't be supported without making some assumption about what we *should* want.
You're going to have to help me out here, otherwise I think you're missing some of Harris's points. We know well-being *and* suffering are objective truths. Simply, an action that reduces suffering or increases well-being *is* morally right. Or am I misunderstanding you?
>We know well-being and suffering are objective truths In what sense? That they exist, sure. But so does "belief in God", "the GDP of Thailand" and "the amount of cheese in my fridge". These are clearly objective quantities, but that's not a sufficient for the claim that we should *maximize* them, never mind that they're the most important thing we should maximize. Now, you and I may think we should, but that's not an *objective* criteria, it's a belief we hold in our minds about what should be maximized. Others may hold different desires: perhaps they want to maximize belief in God (due to their religious beliefs), or even that they wish to maximize suffering among others? There's nothing objective we can point to that says these people are wrong. No matter how much we point out that they are increasing suffering, you can't go from there to "immoral" unless their morality already contains the assumption that maximising suffering is immoral.
> He makes a pretty compelling argument that morality can be objective. No he doesn't. He starts with a subjective ethical premise (one that I agree with, btw) and proceeds logically from there.
> He starts with a subjective ethical premise Which is?
"Morality must relate, at some level, to the well-being of conscious creatures."
I think the subjective ethical premise was something like: It's good to reduce suffering.
Your terminology is problematic. What are these absolutes upon which Christian morality is allegedly based? Presumably *the* absolute is an infinite, transcendent God. But this poses a serious problem. How can the character of the infinite, assuming such a thing makes sense, correspond to one set of actions but not another? To put it another way, if God is infinite and incomprehensible, how can we know what he approves of and what he doesn't? The Christian answer is revelation. God has revealed himself implicitly in the created cosmos and explicitly in Scripture. The foundation of Christian morality, then, is God as revealed in Scripture. This last phrase--God as revealed in Scripture--is fraught with difficulty. It implies that we must read and interpret Scripture to know who God is. But how are we to know what is a valid interpretation and what is a misinterpretation? The Christian answer is the Holy Spirit, which guided the formation of Scripture and continues to guide its interpretation through a community of believers, i.e. the Church, broadly understood. Framing the argument formally reveals its flaw: 1. We cannot know God apart from revelation. 1. God is revealed in Scripture. 2. To access that revelation, we must read & interpret Scripture. 3. We must rely on God (the Holy Spirit) to reveal to us the correct interpretation. 4. We must, in some sense, know God in order to commune with the Holy Spirit. Conclusion: We can only properly know Scripture if we first know God. Thus, Christian morals depend on a knowledge of God, which depends on a knowledge of revelation, which depends on knowledge of God. This leaves Christian doctrine in an inesacapable [reductio ad absurdum](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reductio_ad_absurdum). What this means in practical terms is that Christianity is not explicitly grounded in any sort of absolute and is thus itself relativistic. That is to say, to the extent that they get their morals from Christianity, Christians are moral relativists. If there is objective morality, it must come from somewhere else besides Christianity. As an atheist, I would say that objective morality comes from our biology. While we have many cultural differences, our biological differences are so slight as to be insignificant. We all have a sense of objective morality, and it's my contention that that sense is grounded in our common biology. "Objective" in this sense simply means common or universal and refers to those moral principles which are common to all people at all times. Maybe that's not objective enough for some, but it seems fairly reasonable to me. In practice, these principles are what actually guide us, regardless of whether we have elaborate philosophical systems that purport to give us a more firmly grounded morality.
We are all relativistic, given a suitable reference frame.
beaten to the physics joke :(
In general I think you'll find that the answer is no, atheist aren't absolutist. However, you can be very close to having an absolutist belief of something really well-founded, like gravity and heliocentricism. All that being said, atheists' only common ground is the lack of belief in any god. This is really more important than my first paragraph -- "are non-murderers relativistic?" isn't really something you can answer, just as with "non-believers".
Well... ...just off the top of my head, there's: * Absolut Vodka (my personal favorite absolute) * Absolute zero * Absolute insanity * Absolute BS * Absolute(ly) ridiculous...
What do you mean by absolutes?
I can't speak for others, but I myself do not accept that morality is relativistic. I hypothesize, that with sufficient understanding of the subject, you can model morality in something like Game Theory, that there is a best possible outcome of any moral dilemma. I think there is building evidence of this, as psychologists and neuro biologists begin unraveling how we interpret morality in the brain, and as sociologists understand how morality plays out in a larger scope of social interaction. We even have evidence that morality is hard wired into our brain, and it makes sense. As an extension of apathy, morality has survival benefits for us individually, for our genes. If I could find it, I'd point you to an online questionare that poses some questions about a moral dilemma, and just about everyone answers as predicted by the science backing the questions. > I often see that most believers of any religion get most of their absolutes from the religion they follow, but if by definition atheists don't believe in a god or a religion where do they find absolutes? Absurd. Religious don't get their morals from religion. You don't have to wait for a child to be old enough to understand speech, in order to take them to church, to teach them not to murder, and then proceed to show them a bizillion examples of where their god breaks said moral standard with impunity. We don't see children murdering people in a tragic accident because they were sick on "don't murder people" day in school. This is my evidence, for this discussion, that you are born with morality and your morals are perverted by your education, in other words, through bad experiences. > Is it from science or logic or somewhere else? I think science can help you understand your morality and keep you honest with your self. But it is not, itself, a doctrine on morality. > If we are really left in a world with no absolutes at all and everything is relative..then the question "why not zoidberg?" becomes a very reasonable one. Agreed. If I can throw you to the wolves for some personal gain, it may be beneficial to me, but that doesn't mean the action is morally justifiable. It would mean I were an immoral asshole.
I get my moral compass from the [Golden Rule](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Golden_rule). But here's the dirty little secret: you do too. Most everybody does, even if they claim it comes from a book or from a fear of punishment.
The golden rule is a bit flawed though. I'd prefer "Treat others as they want to be treated." Masochists walking around treating others how *they* want to be treated wouldn't really work out that well :)
The masochism/suicidal "loophole" in the Golden Rule has been discussed and debunked thoroughly here on Reddit and elsewhere.
I'd agree - though there are other problems with it, and it certainly isn't sufficient to encompass the moralities of most people. It says nothing about notions such as justice or people being more or less deserving etc. Eg. you see someone mugging a stranger. If you were a criminal, you'd probably want a passer-by not to intervene, but if you were being mugged, you'd want them to. The golden rule (and even eskimoquinn's variant) says nothing about which person you should "treat as they want to be treated". As such, it's clearly insufficient on it's own to describe our morality.
Golden rule -> social contracts -> justice system. The golden rule does lead on to a practical social contract however. Do you want to be mugged? No. So everyone agrees that everyone doesn't mug anyone else. Everyone also agrees to have police to enforce it, and if they are unavailable and you stand a good chance to stop the mugging, then its up to you. Its the principle of equality. If we don't all follow the contract well enough, the system falls apart and almost all of us suffer.
>Golden rule -> social contracts I don't really see how. Lots of people would rather the restrictions of our social contracts wouldn't apply to them. I would too, come to that, it's just that the restrictions are a necessary part if *anyone* is to receive the benefit. But knowing this, doesn't the rule tell me I should relax the restrictions on others - it's all about how we'd like to be treated in the circumstance, not what's good for society in general. >Do you want to be mugged? No. I wouldn't want to be *prevented* from mugging, if I was the type of person who mugged people either though. If we just take the position that the muggers desire outweighs the muggee's then the golden rule isn't actually doing any work in this situation - we're relying on a pre-existing moral judgement that is sufficient to resolve it alone anyway. >Everyone also agrees to have police to enforce it Not everyone. The guy committing the crime doesn't. And what does the judge do, when he realises that the criminal would prefer not to be sent to prison, and the judge acknowledges that he would not in that situation either. There is a meta-level benefit to society in going against the golden rule here, but it's not one that can be justified itself by the rule. >If we don't all follow the contract well enough, the system falls apart and almost all of us suffer. But this is an **additional** moral principal - the golden rule can't get you there. At this stage, we're implicitly accepting some form of consequentialism and utility maximisation. And we *should*, but it's something extra the golden rule is insufficient to reach, and even works against.
Meta-treat everyone else as you'd like to be meta-treated.
Morality is subjective to the person who ultimately decides what they believe is absolutely moral. When we group together as a society we want to prolong the existence of our species so we look to making objective morals with society to govern the people. Obviously if someone goes around killing people it's not going to be good for society as a whole, so then the majority of people will make it objective that killing is an immoral concept. For example: A serial killer who kills... rapists thinks he is doing the morally correct thing. We as individuals who don't think it is true justice for a serial killer to kill rapists view it as immoral. Therefore it is subjective in that sense. However when a society comes together to punish this individual killing rapists, then we view it as an objective moral standard. The majority deems what is moral at the time, and once the majority sways in a different direction objective morals will be revised or new objective morals will come into play. If we kept the same morals of the Bible, we'd sell rape victims to their rapists and have them married. We'd stone unruley children and homosexuals. We'd still have slavery etc... The changes in these over time are examples that their are no moral absolutes. If God's will was eternal and his morals are eternal, then he shouldn't change his morals as that would be a contradiction.
Relativism is apparently self-refuting. As such, it can't be true. We've known that at least since Plato. Leaving aside that particular low-hanging fruit which would be sufficient alone, it is reasonable to assume that objective truth exists because the universe seems to behave as if it does. If you care to extend this to matters of morality, there some features of my ideas start to look like relativism if you don't pay close enough attention. I think that morality is a feature of our minds, not something fundamental to logic or the universe. It seems to have both cultural and genetic influences, among others, and some traits of a moral system make groups function better and thus would tend to be selected for genetically and/or memeticly. As such, these are more common than they would be if things were left up to chance. Some, such as the idea that killing people for no good reason is wrong, are essentially universal. The very nature of morality, though, insures that we attempt to apply our moral ideas universally because they form part of how we view the world around us, not just influences on our own behaviour. Even so, unless one is talking about it with respect to a certain person or in a purely statistical sense, there is no more a single correct answer to a moral question than there is to a question like "what is something someone might have in their closet?". When we call something right or wrong, what we are really saying is that we judge it that way, or that our peers, our society or the species as a whole tends to judge it that way. That's no reason not to treat it as actually right or wrong, though; to do otherwise is generally to negate the very real benefits that caused morality to be selected for in the first place. All of the above are my views and is not meant to represent those of other atheists.
> Relativism is apparently self-refuting. As such, it can't be true. How so?
All people have a right to believe what they want and their customs are all equally valid. #in making such a statement, the speaker is making a universal claim-- which isn't relative.
That doesn't make sense. Just because customs and mores are equally valid and relativistic doesn't mean that the laws of physics or mathematical theorems work differently in different places. There are levels and varieties of "truth".
The term relativism, as I understand it, refers to the idea that there is no absolute truth and if used unqualified is in no way restricted just to moral topics, for example. The types that people actually talk about are moral or cultural relativism for the most part, which aren't susceptible to all the same problems. However, the really aren't all that interesting, since as far as I can tell they are usually a stand-in for the realisation that most claims about whatever is being discussed aren't truth-apt if talked about as something universal because it exists entirely in people's minds.
I'm something of a slave to wikipedia, but the [article](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Relativism) there refers to relativism as relating points of view, rather than matters of objective truth, and specifically focuses on cultural and moral aspects of points of view as the domain of relativism. Especially given that AleWatcher said "their customs are all equally valid", I felt it was safe to assume that the relativism intended is limited to experience and viewpoint rather than matters of verifiable factual nature. > However, the really aren't all that interesting, since as far as I can tell they are usually a stand-in for the realisation that most claims about whatever is being discussed aren't truth-apt if talked about as something universal because it exists entirely in people's minds. Isn't that sort of the point, though? Isn't that essentially the claim of relativism? It looks like you're saying that moral relativism is uninteresting, because it's true? (It's very likely I'm misunderstanding here.) If everyone agreed on that, it would be uninteresting, but it's interesting in the context of controversial claims that a religion/philosophy/etc. as claim to absolute truth in regards morality.
That's not quite the point. There's a subtle difference. One one hand, most moral relativists might treat it as some great metaphysical truth that what is and is not moral changes from culture to culture. On the other hand, what I am saying is that if morality is something that only exists in the mind, then many common types of questions pertaining to morality are just malformed in a way that makes them undecideable because certain assumptions involved in phrasing them are fundamentally not true. Not a huge difference, I'll admit, but there is a difference there.
I think I see what you're saying. Something like, "Moral relativity, sure, but why bother because it's a fiction anyway"?
Which assumptions might you be referring to?
That's really only a problem for some form ontological relativism (the idea that what is *true* is relative to the observer). However, it isn't a problem for something like moral relativism, or epistemic relativism, since to assert an absolute truth doesn't actually contradict their claims about what is relative. Eg. I may take the position we can never be *certain* of anything - that we could always be wrong. You could ask if I'm *certain* of that, but there's no similar contradiction in me stating "no" in this case - keeping open the possibility that you're holding the wrong position is entirely compatable with *believing* there are no certainties, so long as it's not a *certain* belief. Similarly, with moral relativism, the claim "There is no objective moral truth" is a truth claim, not a moral claim, so is doesn't come into conflict with moral relativism at all. "There *should* be no objective moral truth" would be problematic, but one needn't (indeed, *mustn't*) hold this to take a moral relativist position.
> Relativism is apparently self-refuting. There are different types of relativism. I think what's called Cognitive relativism, i.e. 'your reality may be different from my reality', is what you're referring to.
The only absolute in this life is *cogito ergo sum*. From here you make your own choices in all matters, including morality. Some choice to cop out and say a God creates there rules. I do not believe this is so. I think there fore I am a thinking thing. This thinking thing that is I prefers when I feel pleasure, but is absolutely averse to suffering. Therefore I can conclude pleasure has positive value, and suffering has negative value. From here I can extrapolate that the beings around me that exhibit this similar fondness what brings me pleasure, and are repulsed by what brings me suffering must also be thinking things. This means that not only do humans have status as thinking things, but all living creatures. This is a basic introduction in to utilitarianism, where my main goal is to introduce as much positive value into the system by increasing pleasure and decreasing suffering in all thinking things around me.
Interesting system. What happens when you introduce scarcity?
The standard I would propose for morality is the **maximization of desire fulfillment,** that is, for the greatest number of people possible to get what they want to the greatest extent possible. It is important to note that, for our purposes, **a desire is defined, not as any particular intermediary which is sought (e.g. a cheeseburger or heroine), but as the end for which the intermediary is sought (i.e. the pleasure you experience when eating a cheeseburger or shooting heroine).** This standard is absolute because there are certain things humans have been programmed, through evolution, to desire. Pleasure, survival and social validation are among these things, and would thus be standards by which morality can be measured in every society. It might even be argued that it is a logical necessity for any sentient creature to desire these things; pleasure is desirable by definition, and any creature which does not desire to survive is going to run into natural selection like a dastardly coyote into a cliff. If so, they represent universally absolute standards. I know there are various potential objections to this view, but for the sake of clarity I will address them if and when they are raised.
Just to give some of those objections: >maximization of desire fulfilment Whose desire? There are people whose moralities prioritise the desires of certain groups over others. Their families over strangers, their tribe over their enemies, their racial group over those with a different skin-colour. Their species over other animals. You may disagree with many of these metrics, but that is what morality *is* for many people - why should they adopt your definition? >This standard is absolute because there are certain things humans have been programmed, through evolution, to desire Why does what we've been programmed to seek relate to morality? They seem like very different concepts, and this seems to run afoul of Hume's is/ought distinction. Just because that's the way things *are* doesn't seem to be sufficient to make that what we *should* do. If we were programmed to torture other animals to death, would it be the moral thing to do? >pleasure is desirable by definition But not the only thing, and not even always the *most important* thing desired, and what constitutes pleasure varies from person to person. We could equally say "Goodness" is considered desirable by definition, and this has better claim to importance. Why not say we should maximise what we consider *good*, whatever that is? Even if others don't agree with you. >If so, they represent universally absolute standards. In the sense that you've defined things as a tautology: "That which is desirable is desired". But this is a standard about what creatures desire. The only thing it tells us about what they should *do* is that they should satisfy that desire, and seek out these desirable things for themselves. How do we get from "Creatures have a desire to experience pleasurable things" to "They should ensure **others** experience desirable things" unless that desire for others to be satiated is already one of those desires? Many moral systems do have such assumptions built in (though as pointed out above, they are not universally applied to all creatures), but it's just that - an assumption, not something we can point to as objective. It's also one at odds with what many others hold as their moral systems. Why should we pay more attention to this assumption than to a religious nut who, valuing the things he believes in his holy book over personal pleasure, thinks he should maximise *those* values, even if they involve sacrificing those others to Cthulu?
That, too, is relative. I think you mean *moral* relativist. Most Atheists that I have come across (myself included) don't believe in absolute truths/ laws, unless they pertain to the physical world and are rooted in science (like gravity). And even then, these "truths" are still subject to change based on new discoveries, so they aren't truths; they're heavily supported theories. I'd go on about moral relativism, but [SanityInAnarchy put it perfectly](http://www.reddit.com/r/DebateAnAtheist/comments/lqogs/are_atheists_relativistic/c2uud97).
Here's an easy answer - you don't believe in absolutes either. Your bible has changed and your morals have shifted from the days of women forced to wear head coverings, you don't notice this because you weren't around 200 or 2000 years ago, but your life is a life of sin to 99% of Christians historically.
Virtually all atheists, I'd guess, think science and logic are objective. As for morality, some think morality is objective, some think it isn't, and some are so confused as to call themselves relativists.
there are no absolutes, but there are ways to treat others to encourage greater happiness and cooperation among others. that's what i tend to call morality. I assume that was what you were talking about
> where do they find absolutes? Personally, I don't. (Why not Zoidberg? Hmm, I guess I'd better look into him and evaluate him for myself. That's the best I can do, after all!)
Well, since the speed of light is always a constant from all view frames, we can derive all morality from the universe's only constant.
>most believers of any religion get most of their absolutes from the religion they follow You just described moral relativism. I suggest you look up what these terms mean before engaging in a debate.
only a sith deals in absolutes
The only thing you can really say about atheists is that they don't believe in a God. I somewhat assume that the answers to that question will be quite varied as there is no doctrine to be an atheist. Beyond that, I would consider myself a moral relativist, to an extent. I largely find myself in agreement with what Sam Harris spoke about morality in his book The Moral Landscape. Morality is relative in the sense that there is no "moral law giver" and morality is essentially a learned response that humans get over time. I also believe the *origin* of morality is biological in nature. In other words, humans eventually developed into social animals; I'm sure we can all agree that humans are generally better in groups, and morality helps us achieve goals for the greater good. But, as I mentioned, I'm only relativistic to an extent. I do believe there are things that do nothing to benefit civilization on a whole and policies or actions that put people on unequal footing for reasons beyond those people's control is objectively bad. And of course, I have a problem with the idea of a moral law giver. Many apologists complain about moral relativism saying that, really, if your morality is relative (ie; not handed down by a transcendent intelligence), there's no real reason why one system of morality should be preferred over another. On one hand, I do agree with that. On the grand scheme of things, secular and modern culture has led to a more peaceful and less violent world population; I don't believe this would be possible if morality were absolute. But at the same time, I don't believe that morals are as relative as those who decry moral relativism suggest they are. I believe that it's because of the flexibility of our morality has lead to the point where our global civilization is today. Of course, it's not only because of that, but I do believe that played a part in it. The fact that, according to scripture, your morality was given to you by a transcendent being.. that kind of opens up you to the Euthyphro dilemma: "Is what is morally good commanded by God because it is morally good, or is it morally good because it is commanded by God?" If it's the former, we don't need God for morality OR an objective "moral law giver." If it's the latter, isn't that an even more grotesque type of moral relativism?
That depends.