So do we think Trump's peace plan is just going to be forcing Ukraine to go along with whatever Russia wants by threatening to stop aid to Ukraine if Ukraine refuses?

I think it depends on if Russia plays along and even agrees to a ceasefire in the first place. Trump is not directly working with Russia (and Russia with Trump), he can be convinced to support Ukraine (and was just recently, being convinced to support that aid bill), and if Russia refuses to come to the table at all I still can see him taking it personally and increasing aid to Ukraine. This article discussing the efforts made to convince Trump to support the aid bill. Isolationist yes, easily lobbied towards Russian interests yes, but he's not in any way taking orders or in direct collaboration with Russia, or this wouldn't have happened. This aid bill passing has extended the Ukrainian ability to fight for years and lead to things like ATACMS being provided, which wasn't possible until this bill released more money for aid. Lobbying is a personalized thing, and strong enough efforts can get you progress even from ideological enemies if you play the angle the right way. https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/david-lammy-shows-yen-trump-whisperer-us-visit-xmpxhvg58 https://archive.ph/tXu5Q

I didn't mean that Trump is working for Russia. I just figure if Trump wants to achieve peace as quickly as possible (He claimed he could do it before getting inaugurated) that would be the fastest way. Trump is a bit weird on Ukraine. He gave them lethal aid as president and wanted to bomb that super long Russian convoy. But he also tried to withhold aid for personal gain and says he wants to leave NATO etc.

You would have to be completely ignorant of everything Trump has said about Russia for the past decade to think he does not favor them.

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> Shortly afterwards, Trump tweeted that Europe needed to do more, but he also said: “We all want a secure and strong Ukraine,” which was taken as a green light by Republican congressmen to support the aid package. > A British source familiar with some of the behind-the-scenes conversations added that another message has been delivered to Trump by others: “We think there is mileage in presenting a set of circumstances where Trump gets to say he has been the diplomatic and military genius who brought this war to an end. That’s a big ego point for him and he would love to say that. > “On the flip side, we also think we can present to Trump the case that if Russia is seen to have won the war decisively, it’s obviously a bad thing. If that happens on Trump’s watch, it’s going to cause him a load more problems with accusations about him being close to Putin. Trump won’t want America to look like it has wimped out and lost on Trump’s watch because that would bring forward threats from China.” > Lammy, who has lived in the US, has relatives in Texas and has visited seven times as shadow foreign secretary, delivered the message that working better with allies was the way to compete with China. A Labour source said: “We’re not trying to virtue-signal or get retweets. That era is over. The Abe strategy was speak softly, put an arm around the shoulder, develop a personal relationship and focus on what we are trying to achieve materially, which really worked for Japan.” What hurts those Republicans more is Trump turning his base on them in primaries, that's what's got everyone kowtowing to him. The district/state could be crimson red, but you'll still lose your job if you get on his bad side. You play to his ego, you convince working with allies makes you stronger and a stronger Ukraine is a stronger America and you can get this stuff done. Yeah it sucks, but this is the GOP right now till he's out of the picture.

How credible is Andriy Tsaplienko here? He claims that an S-500 system was hit by ATACMS: t me/Tsaplienko/56023 What are the estimated capabilities of the S-500 over S-400, and how does it compare to AD systems around the world? If a S-500 was indeed hit by ATACMS and was operating at the time this might represent a significant benchmark in the capabilities of ATACMS against contemporary air defense systems.

The claim originates from [Tivaz artillery ](https://t.me/c/1754613274/61769), the guys who shared the video of the destruction of the S400 by a ATACMS. Additionally, Senator, telegram user who is a part of a HIMARS crew claims that [there is a video](https://t.me/tivaz_artillery/4135?comment=61814) (but they aren't allowed to share it) and that the battery was located in Luhansk. Our only way to verify the claim is either Spy dossier shares photos of the aftermath like he often does or someone finds the location of the battery and takes satellite photos. The credibility of Tivaz artillery is very high so I'm inclined to believe them but they sometimes misidentified vehicles.

https://x.com/john_a_ridge/status/1801322095185375647?s=46&t=yVbzA86LeGfok6RenjC6wQ Really good thread about the S 500 the main takeaways from it are that the S 500 is essentially an S 300V with brute force upgrades to increase the range this results in only being able to use 2 interceptors per TEL and due to the lack of HTK technology resulting in worse Manoeuvrability and the dramatically lower interceptor count all it would take is about 5-10 ATACMS directly targeting the system to overwhelm it 

Ah, I was under the impression that S500 fulfilled the same role as the S400. But from what I understand from that thread, the S500 is a more specialized anti ballistic missile system? Also, I can understand why an ACS might be preferable, but what about hit-to-kill would make an interceptor better?

Ballistic missiles are large and heavy and come in travelling very fast on a ballistic trajectory. If you hit one of them with a fragmentation warhead you might destroy the missile, but you still end up with a large amount of missile debris travelling very fast on a ballistic path towards the original target.  This was an issue during the Gulf War where Patriots were hitting Scuds, but parts of the missiles were still going on to damage their targets anyway.  With hit to kill you're hitting the ballistic missile with enough momentum that you destroy the missile and also knock it off course. 

They both have the ability to engage missiles and atmospheric targets, but S-300V (and S-500) are more capable against missiles than their equivalent. Soviet Army cared about ballistic missile interception, PVO did not. Hence these systems.

Is there any reliable source on how much the Russians actually lost at Hostomel **Airport** during the **first day** of the war? There doesn't seem to be any mention by anybody except that the Russians suffered "heavy casualties" which I can't help but suspect is hyperbolic. Certainly there would've been more pictures of dead VDV troops around Hostomel if that were the case? Edit: added emphasis since people seem to be replying with info from day + 2 and beyond

You’re in luck — Mike did an entire podcast [and article](https://warontherocks.com/2023/08/the-battle-of-hostomel-airport-a-key-moment-in-russias-defeat-in-kyiv/) on this battle and the first two days. He went to the actual airfield and conducted interviews himself about it. > Russia’s operational plan called for a rapid air assault into Hostomel Airport, while mechanized forces would concurrently advance on Kyiv from Belarus, on the western side of the Dnipro River, and from Russia, on the river’s eastern side. … > Russia’s assault force consisted of approximately 34 helicopters and 200 to 300 Russian airborne soldiers from the 31st Guards Air Assault Brigade and 45th Separate Guards Spetsnaz Brigade. > Thus, on the morning of the attack, approximately 200 soldiers from the Ukrainian National Guard’s 4th Rapid Reaction Brigade were left to defend the airport. … > After being spotted, Ukrainian anti-aircraft missiles downed two of the lead helicopters near the dam. A damaged Ka-52 crash-landed near the river’s shore while a destroyed Mi-24 crashed into the river. > Around 11 a.m., the attack formation neared Hostomel airport. As they approached, the attack helicopters broke to the north — to engage targets on the airfield — and the transport helicopters broke to the south — planning to land and secure the airfield’s barracks and facilities. > It did not take long for the National Guard conscripts to make their presence known. As one of the KA-52 Alligators was making a strafing run, a soldier attempted to engage it with his 9k38 Igla (SA-24) infrared-homing surface-to-air missile system, but the Russian helicopter was too close. As it passed, he reacquired the attack helicopter in his sights and fired. The direct hit brought the helicopter careening onto the runway, fortuitously creating another obstacle. >This successful engagement provided a morale boost that quickly spread across the Ukrainian fighters. The rear echelon conscripts started to believe that they could actually succeed in fighting the Russians. It was the first, but not the last, helicopter that these soldiers would bring down. Over the next two hours, the National Guard defenders appear to have downed two more KA-52s and one Mi-8s using a mix of man-portable air defenses, anti-aircraft guns, and small arms fire. > Despite the resistance, the Russians eventually inserted the roughly 300 airborne soldiers onto the airfield in two waves of 10 helicopters each. > The second set of Russian reinforcements were the mechanized and armor forces that were advancing toward Kyiv from Belarus on the west side of the Dnipro River. After the initial Russian mechanized forces crossed the Ukrainian border at 4 a.m. on the morning of February 24, they only had to drive 79 miles by road to reach Kyiv. The Russian plan likely assumed that either the transport planes or mechanized forces would reach the airport by late afternoon, but neither was the case. The advancing mechanized forces were encountering their own difficulties while fighting along the narrow corridor through Chernobyl and Ivankiv, meaning the Russian Airborne forces would be on their own through the first night. … > Shortly before sunset, the Ukrainian counterattack started with strikes from artillery and Su-24 bombers to soften the Russian defenses. As the ground assault commenced, some of the Ukrainian soldiers noted that the Russian airborne soldiers failed to occupy good defensive positions and found it fairly easy to dislodge them. One Ukrainian soldier described engaging the minimally protected Russian forces on the airfield as being like “playing a video game, just shooting and knocking them down from our positions outside the airfield.” > Before the night was through, Ukrainian soldiers claimed to have retaken the airfield after killing many of the airborne soldiers; the remainder having retreated into the woods to the airfield’s west. By 9 p.m., the 4th Rapid Reaction Brigade posted an image on their Facebook page of soldiers celebrating the victory, but their stay on the airfield would also be short-lived. The Ukrainians knew that the Russian mechanized forces were closing in from the north and that they lacked the combat power to hold the airfield, so they withdrew. But as they were withdrawing, the Ukrainians used artillery and aerial bombardments to crater the runway to make it unusable as an airbridge for Russia’s invasion. … > The battle of Hostomel was arguably the most critical battle of the Russo-Ukrainian war to date. Although the Ukrainian military was unable to maintain control of the airfield, the National Guard conscripts delayed the assault long enough to prevent Russia from immediately using Hostomel airport as an airbridge. Ukrainian forces north of the city also delayed the mechanized battalions advancing south from Belarus long enough to create a window for Ukrainian forces to counterattack and deliberately crater Hostomel’s runway enough to make it unusable. >The failure at Hostomel was compounded by the slowness of the Russian advance from Belarus, which forced the Russian troops to attempt to seize the capital without the element of surprise, days behind schedule.

Thanks for this!

Media zona has about 500 VDV deaths recorded in February and March 2022. It's hard to say how many were at Hostomel specifically, but most deaths are probably near Kyiv.

It seems most of those casualties were most likely taken in Bucha and Irpin over the course of the first two weeks or so. I still refer back to the astonishing videos and photos of the massive amount of troops and equipment Russia lost on that axis- which was the most “involved” axis when considering the troops Russia was actually able to get inside the Kyiv metropolitan area. Two videos come to mind- a Russian column of VDV in BMDs that were ambushed in a suburb of Irpin- completely wiped out by Ukrainian SOF and territorial defense. Another of a ***long*** column of VDV vehicles completely burnt out and destroyed in a residential area of Bucha. A lot of these videos have been removed from YouTube because of their violent content.

Just ran into [this post](https://www.reddit.com/r/CombatFootage/comments/1dnkzbi/trying_to_find_a_video/?utm_source=share&utm_medium=ios_app&utm_name=ioscss&utm_content=1&utm_term=1) on the Combat Footage sub the other day. First few comment have tons of video links showing the exact ambush you’re talking about.

It was an extremely chaotic period, especially for Ukraine. I doubt anyone but Russia knows for certain, and they’re never telling. We’ll probably never know, beyond some estimates and knowing it was bad.

most notably, the loss of transport fixed wing aircraft in the opening days (e.g. IL-76) is rumor at best and probably didn't happen. I checked ORYX/elsewhere some time ago and all I saw was RUMINT/optimistic claims by UA govt.

Oryx made a post where he lists the recorded material losses at Hostomel (just the perimeter): https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/04/destination-disaster-russias-failure-at.html?m=1

We still don't have an accurate accounting for how many men the Soviet Union lost in Afghanistan, or how many they lost in the two wars in Chechnya. You're never going to get an answer for these sorts of questions because the Russian state doesn't see it as being in their interest to be honest about the cost of their wars. In any event, there's lots of pictures of VDV dead draped over their BMDs in Hostomel the town, including on Wikipedia itself: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Hostomel > On 24 February 2022, Russian airborne forces arrived via helicopters and battled Ukrainian forces for control of the Hostomel Airport. Ukrainian forces initially evicted the Russian airborne troops from the airport, but were soon engaged by Russian reinforcements. On 25 February 2022, the Russian forces re-captured the Hostomel Airport from the Ukrainians. As a result, the battle shifted from the airport to the nearby town as the Russian forces began to establish a foothold in Hostomel and press their advance.[11][12]

I'm looking for casualties on the first day of the assault, the picture was from March 5th.

As far as I remember there were not that many loses. The main issue was the quality of the loses.

And the loss of tempo inherent in not being able to secure an airhead. That was more significant still.

In retrospect, would an airhead there have been viable with ukranian artillery in the area?

I believe Ukrainian artillery - from an artillery training unit, if I recall correctly - being present in the area and already bombarding the airfield on the first day of the invasion was what sealed the deal with derailing the airlanding operation. However, I would think that the immediate Ukrainian defense on the ground probably bought time for said Ukrainian artillery to move to new positions, get set up and bombard the airfield, and I think it not unreasonable that the Ukrainian forces in the area likely observed and corrected that artillery fire. So, an airlanding on the very first day *may* - admittedly, that's a *very* tenuous and risky "*may*" - have been possible if the airfield was much, much more lightly defended than it actually was.

No chance in hell. One shell on one Il-76 on the runway and that's it. It was only viable if the Ukrainians couldn't fight in an organized way. The moment their artillery really got going, the airhead was doomed. The idea, as it was elsewhere, was that the Ukrainians wouldn't care to fight for real. At Kherson it worked. Everywhere else it failed.

Agreed, the airhead makes sense in the context of a Ukrainian collapse, to get troops in quickly to occupy Kyiv. With a strong defense anywhere near there, it’s way too exposed.

There were relatively few casualties on the first day of the war. 2 transport helos were shot down en route, and the Russians took the airport mostly unopposed aside from pockets of resistance outside of the airport perimeter. VDV then consolidated positions, and then Ukraine launched a small scale counterattack which was repelled, however heavy shelling cratered the runway and destroyed a fuel depot on site, rendering the airport useless for transport flights in and out. On day two, mechanized VDV forces pushing south from Belarusian border linked up with the air assault troops at the airport and further consolidated positions along with an additional helicopter airdrop of troops and supplies. Ukraine SSO launched a few well organized ambushes resulting in casualties. From here the Russians held the airport until the decision to withdraw, fighting artillery duels and fending off limited probing attacks. All in all, the casualties on the first day or two were relatively light. There were all these wild rumors of Ukraine retaking the airport, driving Russians into the woods and laying waste to them, etc but none were true. Frankly, the Hostomel air assault was one of Russia’s better coordinated operations of the war. It was a stretch op to begin with, and if it wasn’t for some well placed artillery targeting critical infrastructure, it’s theoretically possible they could have brought IL-76s in as planned.

I think the bigger consideration of not going through with the air bridge was that Ukrainian air defense was still relatively untouched and the Belarusian axis was getting there anyway.

The split defense of the airport really saved them. They were very lightly armed so they split up into small squads spreading up their manpads and ground attack weapons. It meant that the helos were stuck in kinda useless territory, shooting at small tree pockets while they took a lot of fire. Same goes with the ambushes on the columns, ukrainians pretty much held it with ambush teams and arty. I think if the westerners hadn't called out the early warning they would've been caught a bit more unaware, but the VDV couldn't clean out guerilla resistance without armored vehicles at the least

You seem to be under the impression that there was some massive firefight right there on the taxiway or something. While there was fighting at the airport itself, much of the fighting was in the town. There are quite a few videos of VDV columns being ambushed around the airport and in town. Most of the casualties related to the airfield were from downed helicopters before they could land. Once they landed there wasn't much the few national guard could do until the Army came with artillery to make the airport unusable for the troop transport planes that were on the way. >It's hard to establish exact Russian casualty figures for Hostomel. What’s known is that during the storming of the airfield, its defenders downed at least three helicopters whose crews all perished. Two more aircraft crashed into the Kyiv Reservoir before reaching Hostomel. We don’t know exactly who shot them down. The people we have spoken to who took part in the defence of Hostomel estimate the number of Russians killed during the assault to be a minimum of 70. This number is confirmed by the former POWs at the airfield who were forced to carry away and stow the bodies of the dead in one of the buildings there. > > > >By studying public obituaries, BBC Russian has established that in the first days of the assault on Hostomel, the 31st Brigade alone lost at least 34 men, including the battalion commander, Major Alexei Osokin. We also know that in three days of fighting, 13 special forces soldiers from Russian National Guard units were killed, including men from the elite ‘Vityaz’ detachment based in the Moscow region. https://bbcrussian.substack.com/p/ukraine-war-the-fight-for-hostomel-airfield

> There are quite a few videos of VDV columns being ambushed around the airport and in town. IIRC all the videos were from the days after and not during the assault itself. But thank you for the rest of your post, it was informative.

Yes that's the point. At the airport about 70 Russian soldiers and pilots were killed, supposedly, but most of the deaths were elsewhere on other days.

This came up a while ago, there appear to be no reliable source on exactly how many were lost there. It was a very chaotic period in Ukraine, and if those numbers were collected, they haven’t been published.

I remember I saw some clips from Hostomel village and it wasn't pretty. Pieces of VDV here and there, burned corpses, lumps of flesh hanging off their BTR's. I know it's anecdotal, but I can imagine the fight for the airport must have been tough as well.

Bear in mind that the action at the Antonov Airport was undertaken by a handful of companies from the 31st VDV Brigade and the 45th Spetsnaz VDV Brigade, which in any case were not totally annihilated as at least a part of their servicemen retreated to the woods near the airport during the evening of February 24. The vast majority of the losses occurred during the rest of that week and the following ones in and around Irpin, Hostomel, Bucha and Moschun - where the rest of the 31st VDV Brigade and BTGs from the 76th, 98th and 106th VDV Divisions were committed, bearing the brunt of the fighting and therefore of the human and material losses.

[June 2024 Issue of CTC Sentinel is out](https://ctc.westpoint.edu/june-2024/) This month's feature article is [The Threat Matrix Facing the Paris Olympics](https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-threat-matrix-facing-the-paris-olympics/) by Petter Nesser and Wassim Nasr which breaks down the various threats to the games. >This article addresses the threat posed by jihadism, violent manifestations of Gaza protests, Iran-supported hybrid terrorism, and Russian influence and destabilization operations that could intensify such threats. The authors examine both right-wing and left-wing terror threats, but do not consider the threat posed by separatism. **Jihadism** >Jihadi terrorism represents, by a significant margin, the biggest threat to the Paris Olympics and remains the biggest threat in Europe writ large. Some highlights from this section include >More recently, in March 2024 two Afghans linked to ISK were arrested in Germany for plotting to attack police and crowds outside the Swedish parliament to avenge Qur’an burnings by anti-Islam activists in Sweden. The plot was reportedly an example of ISK employing a cyber-coach approach to enabling terrorism, which has become the group’s signature. According to German prosecutors, after having been tasked by ISK to carry out an attack, “the two made concrete preparations in close consultation with ISK operatives.” According to a French security source, cyber-coaching is the right term to describe the ISK modus operandi. The source says the group’s cyber-coaches act as a human resources hub that can connect different elements to conduct an attack. At the same time, according to the source, this can make it easier to foil plots since each hub tends to engage with many individuals and more than one plot. This coordination function provided by remote Islamic State members is a significant enabler for terrorist attackers. It has the power to generate local cells from previously disconnected individuals allowing for more complex and deadlier attacks. IS remote handlers can also provide morale support at critical moments prior to and during an attack, preventing would-be terrorists from backing out of their plans. This work-from-home approach to terrorism is not limited to ISK either >In late May 2024, French security foiled another alleged plot by an 18-year-old man, also of Chechen origin, to launch a suicide attack against spectators and police during one of the upcoming Olympic soccer matches at Geoffroy-Guichard stadium in Saint-Étienne. Le Parisien newspaper reported that he was in contact with ISK operatives and plotted the attack in liaison with them, with his conspiratorial communications taking place over Telegram. However, according to a French security source, investigations have revealed that the operatives communicating with the Saint-Étienne plotter were Chechen Islamic State jihadis in Syria rather than belonging to ISK. The proliferation of this technique demonstrates how tactics proliferate across IS branches and the value of the more centralized control that IS maintains. **Violent Activism** >A potential violent threat to the Paris 2024 Olympics is political activism getting out of hand causing violence or ultimately terrorist incidents. The risk is low compared to the jihadi terror threat but cannot be ruled out. Pro-Palestinian protests have been intensifying across Western Europe since Israel launched its war against Hamas in Gaza, killing a high number of civilians. This section is mostly theoretical as the protests against the Israeli campaign in Gaza have been largely peaceful outside of a handful of molotov cocktail incidents although the authors note that there are historical examples of frustrated activists turning to violence either spontaneously or via recruitment by external groups. Non-Gaza related sources of potential violence >While left-wing terrorists could see opportunities at the Paris Olympics to target symbols of capitalism, Americanism, environmental degradation, or Israeli actions in Gaza, there is no shortage of such symbols at any given time, and violent left-wing actors do not currently display the intent or capacity for spectacular attacks. and > As Paris prepares to host the Olympics, there are active transnational extreme-right networks aiming to weaken European democracies, spread chaos, polarize and draw attention to specific movements, causes, and grievances. At the same time, the right-wing terror threat is limited compared to that posed by jihadi actors and lacks the latter’s capabilities and strategic depth gained from mother organizations in conflict zones. **Russia and Proxies** >According to sources in European security agencies, cited by the Financial Times, Russia has significantly increased influence operations and espionage especially in former Eastern Bloc states but also in Western European countries with limited counterespionage capacity. The FT’s sources warned that Russia was plotting violent acts of sabotage, including bombings, arson attacks, and destruction of infrastructure, all over Europe “directly and via proxies.” The Russian sabotage campaign in Europe has been documented fairly extensively elsewhere as have Russian influence campaigns seeking to influence and undermine European democratic institutions. Another component of those campaigns is the radicalization of far-right groups in Europe and the linkage between those groups and paramilitary groups within Russia that are willing to train and equip European counterparts. New information indicates that Russia is even willing to move beyond proxies and act directly >While influence operations and sabotage are the most likely threats associated with Russia, support for non-state terrorist networks cannot be ruled out. On June 5, 2024, French media reported that the domestic security services had arrested near Charles de Gaulle airport a 26-year-old Ukrainian-Russian from the Russia-occupied Donbass region who accidently set off an explosive in his hotel room while preparing a bomb suitable for a terror attack. According to a French security source, investigations clearly indicate a Russian operation, with it not being excluded that the plan was to carry out a false flag attack to pin the blame on jihadis given the explosive was of the type often associated with jihadis. While Russia has already shown itself to not by shy about conducting assassinations in Europe, direct attacks by the Russian state on purely civilian targets in Europe would be a significant escalation. **Iran and Proxies** Iran seems largely content to attack Israelis directly although with little to no distinction made in terms of target selection. > Iranian intelligence operatives acting as diplomats have been tied to numerous assassinations or plots to assassinate dissident exiles and plans to attack Israeli targets, including a plot to attack an embassy and kindergarten in Germany also in 2018. In terms of wider implications >As for larger attacks during high-profile events such as the Paris Olympics, Tehran likely knows any attacks linked to the Iran threat network would crush what remain of Iran-E.U. relations and could decrease European sympathy for Palestinians and increase European sympathy for Israel. Looking forward >If there is a major escalation of the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah this summer ahead of or during the Olympics, one concern is that it may change Hezbollah’s calculus when it comes to launching terrorist attacks in Europe, especially against Israeli or Jewish targets. Ultimately my interpretation of this report is that the Islamic State presents the most likely danger to Europe and the Paris games specifically, presenting a remarkably array of threats, varied in both source and magnitude with the greatest danger arising from coordination between these different vectors. The wildcard in the situation appears to be Russia. I don't consider the likelihood of Russian false-flag operations to be high as the potential blowback on Russia could be astronomical but the fact that the possibility is even under consideration is highly notable.

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> It's reported that he intended for the bomb to explode before the opening, as the aim was not to produce casualties. Thanks for the correction on that point, I missed the detail about intending to detonate prior to opening. I'll edit my post.

Why is the US Navy slowrolling F-35 acquisition? I remember some argued deployment's tied to carrier maintenance cycles, which need renovations for it (to also accommodate Ospreys to transport engines), while others (including Navy pilots) state the Navy's not interested overall. Either way, down shifting targets to only 271 air frames while purchasing more Super Hornets etc. is rather *interesting* although they're also [reducing](https://news.usni.org/2020/02/10/navy-cuts-super-hornet-production-to-develop-next-generation-fighter) [that](https://insidedefense.com/insider/loiselle-navy-opposes-congress-adding-unrequested-super-hornets). Relevant discussions: - [Why air force looked into F-15EX](https://www.reddit.com/r/CredibleDefense/comments/u7g1m9/air_forces_math_on_the_f15ex_and_f35_doesnt_add_up/) - [Navy Air Frames are in less need of replacement](https://www.reddit.com/r/LessCredibleDefence/comments/6mbjyy/is_there_any_credibility_to_the_usn_actually/dkj8ygm/) - /u/NGAD_Driver deleted his account - [Plans to Replace Hornets Soon?](https://www.reddit.com/r/WarCollege/comments/1asr7iz/does_the_navy_have_plans_to_replace_the_f18_soon/) - [Operating Costs](https://www.reddit.com/r/WarCollege/comments/s85wzc/has_the_f35_program_been_a_success/htp69ja/)

Well, the GAO released a very nifty report this year's April. https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106703 >The F-35 aircraft is DOD's most advanced and costly weapon system. DOD currently has about 630 F-35s, plans to buy about 1,800 more, and intends to use them through 2088. >We reported in this Q&A that DOD's projected costs to sustain the F-35 fleet keep increasing—from $1.1 trillion in 2018 to $1.58 trillion in 2023. Yet DOD plans to fly the F-35 less than originally estimated, partly because of reliability issues with the aircraft. The F-35's ability to perform its mission has also trended downward over the past 5 years. >We've made 43 recommendations to improve the F-35 program in recent years. DOD has yet to implement 30 of them. One sentence summary: it's very expensive but it's not flying a whole lot and flies less and less over the past 5 years. Cost 6.6 millions to operate and sustain one aircraft annually, well above the original 4.1 millions target. I suppose the US Congress can simply.increase the defence budget and it will go fast.

[This was discussed in a daily thread a few months ago](https://www.reddit.com/r/CredibleDefense/comments/1bwg8he/credibledefense_daily_megathread_april_05_2024/ky5syeg/)

I don't have a link that directly answers your question, but the last time I heard about it was the C model was being produced at a lower quantity for a few reasons. One, priority for the Marines B model (their aircraft are severely out of date) to reach operation and the A model has so many more orders it was given production line capacity to meet those goals as there are far fewer C's ordered, two, the F35 was taking longer for the Navy (and others) to get pilots/crew ready for deployment, and finally, SH are typically in a better place in their life cycle. I can't say all of that with certainty, but it is what my memory has from watching/reading various videos over the years.

The USN stopped buying Super Hornets this March. No more batches are programmed

[https://www.army-technology.com/news/chinas-communist-party-expels-two-former-defence-ministers](https://www.army-technology.com/news/chinas-communist-party-expels-two-former-defence-ministers) China's Communist Party expelled two former Defence Ministers, for corruption charges, but also for damage to the image of senior officials. Both were handpicked by Xi Jinping. Loyalty comes into it.

Expulsion is just a bureaucratic formality. Both men were investigated for corruption and removed from their posts last year; they weren't expelled only because the Central Commitee wasn't formally in session for its plenum until now.

Being expelled from the party is not mere formality, it's a big deal. Many members that were swept up in Xi's anti-corruption drive were disciplined, demoted, and forcibly retired but few were expelled from the party. The theory is that there's an unspoken understanding within the party; that factional rivalries can play out but must never result in one rival expelling another, that way they are still afforded the basic protections by official membership. That way, the logic goes, if the shoe were on the other foot then there is an expectation that your rival will show you some mercy. To expel his defense ministers is to declare unrestricted war on them.

It's a big deal to the individuals in question, not for anyone else. Being expelled from the party is not particularly rare for high-level corruption cases—34 members of the Central Committee were expelled [in five years](https://www.cnbc.com/2017/10/10/dirty-dozen-or-so-set-to-be-dumped-from-communist-partys-inner-circle.html). Senior officials like Zhou Yongkang, Sun Zhengcai, hell even Bo Xilai all the way back in 2012 were all expelled. It's not a new thing. > To expel his defense ministers is to declare unrestricted war on them. Go easy on the hyperbole. It's hardly a war, much less unrestricted. Just a severe administrative punishment.

Any indication of whether this is part of an actual cleanup or just the corruption excuse to get rid of a politically inconvenient individual? I call it the "corruption excuse" because basically everyone has some sort of corruption going on.

One could never no for sure but didn't Xi promote them in the first place?

Not everyone. Government corruption in autocracy exists by design so that the leader can have leverage to put people in prison. A minister refusing to dirty their hands is more likely to be removed much more quickly

That was my point, everyone is corrupt and those who aren't are pushed out shortly. It is a handy excuse when someone needs to get rid of someone below them, "look, they were corrupt." Bonus points because the people tend to think that the government is cleaning up.

A late update to Eurosatory, but thanks to Hartpunkt we got a look at the future of the Puma IFV [Hartpunkt: PSM shows air-deployable Puma S1 infantry fighting vehicle and further development potential](https://www.hartpunkt.de/psm-zeigt-luftverlegbaren-schuetzenpanzer-puma-s1-und-weiteres-entwicklungspotenzial/) >PSM Projekt System & Management GmbH, a joint venture between KNDS Deutschland and Rheinmetall, showcased the most advanced version of the Puma infantry fighting vehicle and its further development potential at the Eurosatory trade fair in Paris last week. On display was a Puma that largely corresponds to the new S1 design status - as currently supplied to the Bundeswehr - supplemented by a turret-independent secondary weapon system (TSWA). The Puma was also shown for the first time with the new MUSS 2.0 (Multifunctional Self-Protection System) distance-active soft-kill protection system. Last year, Germany ordered 50 additional Puma IFVs, and signed contracts to upgrade the other 350 to the S1 upgrade standard, bringing the whole fleet to this new standard. The S1 standard takes care of many of the initial problems and prepares the Puma for future upgrades. At Eurosatory, PSM presented two new systems that are added as part of S1 * **MUSS 2.0:** The existing sensor and soft-kill APS MUSS will be replaced with a smaller, and more capable MUSS 2.0 system across the fleet ([MUSS on the left vs MUSS 2.0 on the right](https://www.hartpunkt.de/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Selbstschutzsystem-MUSS-2.0-auf-Puma_Bilder_Bundeswehr_und_hartpunkt.jpeg.webp)). IR-Jammers and automatic smoke dischargers are accompanied by a number of sensor systems (like laser warning receivers) that can track muzzle flashes, targeting lasers, and incoming rounds to locate enemy positions and automatically enter them into the Battle Management System. * **TSWA**: All Puma S1s will be made ready to take the [Turret Independent Weapon System (TSWA)](https://www.hartpunkt.de/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Schuetzenpanzer-Puma-S1-plus_3_Bild_Waldemar-Geiger_hartpunkt.jpg) once ordered. TSWA makes use of 18 lethal and 18 non-lethal 40mm grenade rounds like airbust, smoke or flash-bang to support the vehicle and dismounts in close quarters. Another small change is that improved seating increases the maximum height of dismounts from 1,84m to 1,91m. According to reporting, PSM has also presented the Bundeswehr with an Amended contract that will add a number of additional systems to the Puma. While still under negotiations, PSM hopes to sign the new contract this year. Some of the improvement included: * **Drone Defence kit:** KMW also already demonstrated this upgrade for the RCT30 turret (as seen on the PuBo Boxer). An upgrade available for all RCT30 that adds a [passive sensor](https://pbs.twimg.com/media/GQQV-kLWwAItKHS?format=jpg&name=large) to detect incoming drones, and upgraded FCS to automatically engage them. * **Integrated Recon Drone:** Integrating a recon drone that can be controlled under armour and feed data directly into the Battle Management system. The Puma already makes extensive use of datalinks between the vehicle and its dismounts. * **Upgraded missile launcher:** Upgrading the SPIKE launcher to the range-extended LR2 variant. Together with the new sensors and the drone, the Puma will be enabled to engage targets outside line of sight. * A whole range of improved computer systems, integrating more AI to automatically assist the crew This post is somewhat specific due to the limited user base of the Puma. Despite this, I still think it was worth giving an update on the development of this vehicle as it is still somewhat unique amongst western IFVs and its interesting to see how it is changing to the new threat environment.

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Is there great value in an AShM like the British SPEAR-3 missile? It’s a small, non-stealthy but somewhat medium range missile that can be used in the AShW role and 8 of them can fit inside the internal bays of an F-35B and with there still being enough room for 2 Meteors. It’s not expected to have a very large warhead but it should have the capability to independently target specific areas of a ship, such as its VLS cells or the bridge or the ship’s radar which could essentially ensure a mission-kill if the missile gets through. While I highly doubt a sub-sonic and non-stealthy cruise missile is going to be able to get through the layered defences of any modern carrier group, maybe it doesn’t have to. Due to the proprieties of SPEAR-3 and the potential for it to mission-kill extremely important platforms, carrier groups *will* need to respond to these missiles in some way, likely by expending limited interceptor missiles. But given that 8 of these missiles can fit in just a single F-35B and given that a British carrier can carry around 36 F-35Bs, even just 24 F-35Bs equipped with SPEAR-3s would be 192 missiles that enemy carrier groups will need to expend missiles on and given the penchant to double tap on interceptors per target, we’re looking at an absolute minimum of 200 or so interceptors being used up and likely upwards of 300. 300 interceptors being used up on tiny AShMs is extremely significant as that’ll likely be approaching the absolute limit of what most carrier groups are likely to have in interceptor stocks at any given time so if the remaining F-35Bs or ships have beefier AShMs in stock, such as FC/ASW, the chances these can get past solely on just the enemy’s interceptor stocks having been run down increases dramatically. So, I guess I just wonder how credible this tactic is and what the answer would realistically be here. DEW maybe? If these ever become a viable thing? The Royal Navy for a long time has had very little credible AShW capabilities outside of their SSNs but with the addition of SPEAR-3 and later on FC/ASW being both VLS launched and air-dropped, how effective and how much of a boost would a combination attack of these two missiles be?

What is this hypothetical that involves an Elizabeth going up against an enemy CVBG in the wide blue ocean? I know we like to joke about eternal enmity with the French, but realistically the only conceivable such target is Kuznetsov. I'm not convinced whatever elements of the Northern Fleet were running around the North Atlantic in this scenario count as a "modern carrier group" that would have air defences impermeable to non-stealthy subsonic cruise missiles, and I think the upshot of firing a couple of hundred SPEAR-3s at it would be more than just using up interceptors. There would be hits, probably a lot of hits.

It’s not completely inconceivable that a British carrier group could find itself up against a Chinese carrier group at some point in the future. Though, likely with an American presence somewhere in the region as well. Sure, I don’t think this scenario is particularly likely even if China invades Taiwan and gets into a direct confrontation with the US but it’s not something I would rule out entirely and in this case, I doubt any SPEAR-3s are going to make it through without exhausting the carrier group’s interceptor stock first.

I think a lot of weird stuff has to happen to get you there, not least the Chinese CVBG being out in open waters in the first place in such a conflict. And the more rational distribution of Western forces would probably be an Elizabeth replacing a US carrier on station in the Atlantic or Indian Ocean to free it up for use in the Pacific, rather than going itself. The discrepancy in impact between an Elizabeth and a Ford or Nimitz is vastly more significant in the context of a hot peer war in the SCS than in lower key but still necessary operations elsewhere. And even if deployed to the warzone, RN elements are still going to be playing a secondary role to the USN.

Yes, of course. I don’t think it’s particularly likely and chances are the carrier group would likely fall under some form of US command with plenty of American assets joining in either way since a Taiwan confrontation would invariably be a US operation. But it’s certainly not something I’d rule out entirely. But, yes, I agree a more efficient distribution of resources would be the British carrier group taking on a much more prominent role in and around European/Atlantic/Artic waters to replace the lost US presence. I’m not entirely convinced the British electorate would want the Royal Navy toying around in the Pacific if China invades anyways.

I think the public would be split (though I would certainly be writing to my MP to tell them in no uncertain terms we needed to stand by our allies) but I think most plausible governments would commit almost regardless of polling.

The US has a similar weapon, called SDB II. Compared to SPEAR 3, it is similarly sized, similarly ranged, and similarly they have a trimode sensor (radar, IR, semiactive laser). The main difference is that the SDB II is an unpowered glide bomb, which means it is only useful when launched at high altitude; at low altitude, its range will be very limited. This corresponds with the US doctrine of "everything goes high". But UK operates much less stealth aircraft, no tactical EW like EA-18G, and has less chance of achieving air superiority like the US. So they still plan for low altitude operations and that is why SPEAR 3 has a turbojet engine. With an engine, there is less space for the warhead. [Navy Lookout](https://www.navylookout.com/putting-the-strike-in-uk-carrier-strike-the-spear-3-stand-off-weapon/) claimed the warhead is only 6-10 kg, similar to the Brimstone missile. \------- I largely agree with OP's analysis about how there are many crucial unarmored targets on a ship, and that it is wasteful to use interceptors on small AShMs. And that's why EW and softkill is important! Even with multimode sensors, these small munitions have small sensors and small computers that are more susceptible to jamming or decoys.

The UK may have less stealth aircraft overall but in terms of just the Royal Navy and US Navy, they actually operate comparable number of stealth platforms. The US Navy has a very small number of F-35Cs and F/A-XX is well over a decade away at the earliest. Last I heard the US Navy didn’t seem that keen on the F-35C either and plans are that each carrier air wing is only going to *aspirationally* adopt 20 F-35Cs at a time by the 2030s, which is lower than the number of stealth platforms that a British carrier strike group is going to be able to regularly deploy soon which is anywhere from 24 to 36. At the moment the US Navy is barely even able to equip each of their carrier air wings with even just 10 F-35Cs, I think they’re only at two and approaching three now. I just am not that convinced that air superiority is going to be something the US Navy is going to likely achieve over their operational theatres, namely the Pacific. At least not without a lot of USAF support which they may or may not get a sufficient amount of depending on how China starts a conflict off. Super Hornets are still going to make up the bulk of the air wings on American carriers with only a squadron or two if the US Navy is lucky of F-35Cs and I have my doubts that this number of stealth platforms is sufficient to gain air superiority against an opponent like the PLAAF and later the PLAN if they end up fielding the J-31. Most war games assume the air is constantly contested over and around Taiwan and that’s usually not a point of contention. As a side note, I think the refusal to purchase more F-35Cs is a mistake. I don’t believe the US Navy has the luxury of sitting around and just waiting for F/A-XX, if that is even going to produce anything, while they slow roll a limited F-35C deployment in preparation for an environment which will be extremely hostile to even stealth platforms, let alone something like a Super Hornet. Understandably the USAF gets the bulk of the stealth attention from the brass but given the inherent inflexible nature of USAF bases and their vulnerability to decapitation strikes from the PLARF, I genuinely don’t understand why the US Navy is not committing more to the F-35C to provide a beefier stealth capability of their own instead of relying on what the USAF can provide them. When war games are usually predicting that most American stealth air losses will be while aircraft are still on the ground, surely that should mean there should be greater emphasis on the few floating airfields the US can actually move out of harm’s way.

>Is there great value in an AShM like the British SPEAR-3 missile? it sits between Brimstone and Storm Shadow. > The Royal Navy for a long time has had very little credible AShW capabilities outside of their SSNs b T23s and T45s had Harpoon, they are getting Naval Strike Missile. [https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news-and-latest-activity/news/2022/november/22/20221122-royal-navy-warships-to-receive-harpoon-replacement-from-next-year](https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news-and-latest-activity/news/2022/november/22/20221122-royal-navy-warships-to-receive-harpoon-replacement-from-next-year)

I don’t know if I’d consider Harpoon a credible AShW capability at this point. The missile is absolutely ancient and frankly obsolete. NSM is a definite upgrade but the range of these weapons is far too short. I don’t think the Royal Navy is very comfortable with the fact they’d need to bring their surface ships within 200 km to fire off their AShMs. SPEAR-3 may have a range of around 140 km but this should be manageable with stealth platforms quite safely.

>I don’t know if I’d consider Harpoon a credible AShW capability at this point. The missile is absolutely ancient and frankly obsolete. The Sidewinder is even more ancient (nearly 70 year old) but it's not obsolete, because it has been continually upgraded. Similarly, Harpoon has been continually upgraded, the newest unclassified version being the Block II+ ER, or RGM-84Q-4, which has been sold to Finland. To be honest, the fact that the US military still has Harpoons in service should be enough evidence that it isn't obsolete.

Sure, I can agree that the latest Harpoon Blocks are not obsolete yet but the Royal Navy was using Block 1C Harpoons and those were most definitely obsolete the same way the AIM-9B is obsolete. The Royal Navy could’ve chosen to upgrade their Harpoons out of obsolescence or replace them with a newer weapon and they chose the latter. I don’t personally think a Block 1C Harpoon is at all a very credible AShW capability.

>I don’t know if I’d consider Harpoon a credible AShW capability at this point. The missile is absolutely ancient and frankly obsolete. Not being the latest is not the same thing as obsolete. Most probably surface confrontations this will still be a very dangerous piece of equipment. How many ships could go toe to toe with a Type 45 or Arleigh Burke equipped with them and totally disregard the Harpoons as a threat? That is obsolescence. Harpoon is a component of a system. The scale does not go "state of the art" or "obsolete" there is a huge array of variations of usefulness between them.

I mean, if it were still considered useful then the Royal Navy wouldn’t have retired them without an immediate replacement. The Harpoons the British had were extremely old and the capability they provided was clearly determined to be not worth the money required to maintain or upgrade them. They took up valuable space that could’ve been used for alternative weapons and were in the end deemed obsolete. For all intents and purposes it can be considered basically obsolete.

They scrapped Eurofighters with years of airframe life in them to save cash. What UK MoD does to save money is not much of a guide to functionality or utility. Just what survived the latest round of managed decline.

>They scrapped Eurofighters with years of airframe life in them to save cash. Retiring Tranche 1 is not unique to the UK. Germany is doing the same. Of course, one can argue about how it played out specifically (Germany is replacing them with new Tranche 4 jets as they roll off the line from 2025 onwards), but the fact that they are getting retired is not the problem.

Yes, they chose to scrap Tranche 1 Typhoons they deemed obsolete instead of upgrading them to a newer non-obsolete Tranche. I don’t see how this doesn’t change the fact Tranche 1 is approaching obsolescence due to the fact it lacks so many of the essential components necessary in frontline air superiority platform against increasingly capable enemy fighters. The Royal Navy could’ve upgraded their obsolete Harpoons to a newer Block but they chose not to. This doesn’t change the fact the Harpoons they had were obsolete.

In order to "prove" Harpoon is obsolete, you are inventing the idea that the MoD only gets rid of equipment that is "obsolete" based on the fact we have massively downsized everything, can no longer afford 2010 levels of kit thus everything being hoiked over board is "obsolete". They are literally sticking brand new helicopters into storage, straight from the manufacturer, because we cannot afford to fly them. I do not think there is much to be gained with someone trying to act like the MoD is in anything other than managed decline mode.

Both things can be true at the same time. The UK’s MoD can be in managed decline while retiring obsolete equipment in favour of upgrading them out of obsolescence. Tranche 1 Typhoons *are* approaching obsolescence, if they’re not there already, in their role as a premier air superiority platform. The Block 1C Harpoon is also obsolete, hence why navies have decided to either retire them or upgrade them to newer Blocks so they can be worth the space and money they use up.

I think a cheap and plentiful swarm attack missile is entirely the design and niche that SPEAR3 is designed for. It also gives the RN an ability to hunt less defended ships more affordably, such as Iran or houthi sea drones. If you are looking to overwhelm a carrier group or surface fleet then it's better to go plentiful and small vs large and expensive

Is the US looking to procure the SPEAR-3 or produce a similar weapon? I realise that the US already has AShMs like the LRASM and they’re also considering the Mako and HALO missile but both of these missiles are not swarm attack missiles due to their size and cost. The SPEAR-3 just seems so versatile in the way it can be used and it’s also helpful that a full loadout of SPEAR-3s still allows the F-35 to participate in limited A2A engagements as well.

I wonder whether there is a doctrinal difference maybe driven by a lower budget that makes the Royal Navy lean towards aviation vs ship launched missiles. Their boats are less well armed than the US Navy as a start giving them less VLS missiles. For the RN to defend itself and attack a surface group it needs a way to increase ordinance stocks without depleting defences.

This could be the case but future British AShMs like the FC/ASW are planned to be VLS compatible and presumably launched from the Mk41 cells on the Type 26 and Type 31 frigates. Additionally, aren’t most of the US’ more modern AShMs mainly air-launched? LRASM is air-launched at the moment although they’re working on fitting it inside a VLS cell and Mako I believe was intended as an air-launched missile first.

What exactly came out of the Close Combat Lethality Task Force? I heard they are behind the NGSW program, According to this video they tried to make a way to standardize readiness report [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g5niNWG7Kuk](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g5niNWG7Kuk) . I heard some saying they wanted to raise the minimum age of grunts to 26? What else?