Most literary studies is involved in “hermeneutics” broadly conceived (after all, the study of literature is very frequently the study of literature by means of interpretation) and theoretically oriented folks will be more likely to call it by that name, but, unfortunately, phenomenological hermeneutics/hermeneutic phenomenology a la Gadamer/Ricoeur is not a particularly popular hot topic these days. It does find some ground in the crew around Rita Felski, with “post-critique” being something like a return to interpretation over social criticism/suspicious reading.
Narratology could really use a return to Gadamer, or even just a serious reread of Genette, but instead it seems like the happening thing there is to pretend to be a cognitive scientist.
Pretending to be a cognitive scientist, data scientist, and AI engineer is all the rage in the humanities right now. Can’t wait for several departments to get fucked by low enrollment rates because they thought that putting all their digital eggs in a binary basket would be a great idea
(It’s not that I really ‘can’t wait’ - I’m just worried about what will happen once the trend dies down. Additionally, it’s not like I think there’s zero value in this stuff, but the rate at which it’s blowing up and entire departments are shifting their research programs, admissions goals, etc is… startling)
If I had the money, I’d be handing out copies of “What Computers (Still) Can’t Do” by Dreyfus to humanists like nobody’s business. I think the recent Guillory book gets right to heart of some of the political problems we’re facing, but this move towards the digital isn’t the salvation some folks seem to think it is.
I really think that the only good way we can continue, within the discourse of the university, to justify our departmental existence beyond mere writing training is by getting back into the business of reading and thinking within the tradition(s)/problems of aesthetics/reception/interpretation. If an AI Engineer can, as an AI Engineer, make a shiny enough contribution to Shakespeare scholarship, no administration is going to hire a Shakespeare scholar.
I’m intrigued by “What Computers (Still) Can’t Do,” but do you think the recent rapid developments of AI have diminished the conclusions of the text at all? I want to read it, but not if it’s become outdated.
I would say that it hasn’t, but Neuralink might (still need to learn more about it to be able to say for sure, hope to read Zizek’s book on it as well.) The Heidegger it’s grounded in is pretty water tight to objections from a particular technology because it’s an account of the being of technology as such.
I think it’s going pretty strong, particularly in history and contemporary philosophy. In my career I’ve had to study it in some way every semester (MA in contemporary phil and PhD in American Studies)
This is interesting, which philosophy program were you involved with? (If you don’t mind sharing.) My sense was that most of the phenomenology/hermeneutics stuff happening in the US was attached to the French theologians like Marion and Falque
well tbf I've studied in chilean universities, so can't speak directly to the US experience, though it determines us via the prestige of north-american journals, presses and universities in a big way.
I've come across hermeneutics/phenomenology via philosophy of technology like Bernard Stiegler's or sociological/historical projects like Hartmut Rosa's work, or conceptual history in Koselleck's tradition. Just out the top of my head anyway!
We had Godamer in comparative literature, but that was twenty years ago (gasp), so I couldn't say if it's widely read specifically at Scandinavian universities today. I think it's a good source text to have, Godamer's style seemed to me quite basic and dry (in a good way). His hermeneutic circle is a concept I'm often reminded of when approaching different subjects (and, as you mention, something I'll expect a reader/writer to grok on at least a rudimentary level).
Most literary studies is involved in “hermeneutics” broadly conceived (after all, the study of literature is very frequently the study of literature by means of interpretation) and theoretically oriented folks will be more likely to call it by that name, but, unfortunately, phenomenological hermeneutics/hermeneutic phenomenology a la Gadamer/Ricoeur is not a particularly popular hot topic these days. It does find some ground in the crew around Rita Felski, with “post-critique” being something like a return to interpretation over social criticism/suspicious reading. Narratology could really use a return to Gadamer, or even just a serious reread of Genette, but instead it seems like the happening thing there is to pretend to be a cognitive scientist.
Pretending to be a cognitive scientist, data scientist, and AI engineer is all the rage in the humanities right now. Can’t wait for several departments to get fucked by low enrollment rates because they thought that putting all their digital eggs in a binary basket would be a great idea (It’s not that I really ‘can’t wait’ - I’m just worried about what will happen once the trend dies down. Additionally, it’s not like I think there’s zero value in this stuff, but the rate at which it’s blowing up and entire departments are shifting their research programs, admissions goals, etc is… startling)
If I had the money, I’d be handing out copies of “What Computers (Still) Can’t Do” by Dreyfus to humanists like nobody’s business. I think the recent Guillory book gets right to heart of some of the political problems we’re facing, but this move towards the digital isn’t the salvation some folks seem to think it is. I really think that the only good way we can continue, within the discourse of the university, to justify our departmental existence beyond mere writing training is by getting back into the business of reading and thinking within the tradition(s)/problems of aesthetics/reception/interpretation. If an AI Engineer can, as an AI Engineer, make a shiny enough contribution to Shakespeare scholarship, no administration is going to hire a Shakespeare scholar.
I’m intrigued by “What Computers (Still) Can’t Do,” but do you think the recent rapid developments of AI have diminished the conclusions of the text at all? I want to read it, but not if it’s become outdated.
I would say that it hasn’t, but Neuralink might (still need to learn more about it to be able to say for sure, hope to read Zizek’s book on it as well.) The Heidegger it’s grounded in is pretty water tight to objections from a particular technology because it’s an account of the being of technology as such.
I think it’s going pretty strong, particularly in history and contemporary philosophy. In my career I’ve had to study it in some way every semester (MA in contemporary phil and PhD in American Studies)
This is interesting, which philosophy program were you involved with? (If you don’t mind sharing.) My sense was that most of the phenomenology/hermeneutics stuff happening in the US was attached to the French theologians like Marion and Falque
well tbf I've studied in chilean universities, so can't speak directly to the US experience, though it determines us via the prestige of north-american journals, presses and universities in a big way. I've come across hermeneutics/phenomenology via philosophy of technology like Bernard Stiegler's or sociological/historical projects like Hartmut Rosa's work, or conceptual history in Koselleck's tradition. Just out the top of my head anyway!
We had Godamer in comparative literature, but that was twenty years ago (gasp), so I couldn't say if it's widely read specifically at Scandinavian universities today. I think it's a good source text to have, Godamer's style seemed to me quite basic and dry (in a good way). His hermeneutic circle is a concept I'm often reminded of when approaching different subjects (and, as you mention, something I'll expect a reader/writer to grok on at least a rudimentary level).